THE New Republic

Will the New Nuclear Weapons Help Bring Peace to Our Time?

PAGES 7-12

Leon Keyserling

The Prospects for Prosperity in 1955

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LETTERS
Reinhold Niebuhr, Amos Wilder

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Washington Wire .... *T.R.B.*

Never heard of Theophil C. Kammholz? Well, he is important as an Eisenhower symbol. For 11 years with ardor, skill and integrity he has represented for some of America's big firms one side in labor-employer relations, the employers' side. He is a good lawyer and his professional bias is all in one direction, management's. Ike has picked him for the uniquely powerful discretionary post of general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, a job that holds the balance between employers and trade unions.

There is every reason to believe that Ike chose Theophil in perfect good faith. You can imagine the screams that would have arisen if Ike had picked an attorney specializing in advocating the trade union side! This choice is worth studying because of all its implicit pro-business assumptions which characterize this Administration.

The White House has just announced it would give out no more names of Ike's 15-man stag dinners at the White House. Too embarrassing. Ike, who doesn't read many papers, gets his information largely by ear, supplemented by minuscule staff digests. For 38 White House dinners an analysis shows there were 294 businessmen, 81 Administration officials, 23 GOP leaders and just about 100 others embracing the rest of modern man's culture, science and religion. The important thing, you see, was business. Ike has a respect approaching awe for successful businessmen. He built his Cabinet of them.

Going back to Theophil, he is only one of the major Eisenhower appointments to the NLRB; four board members have been named, two were directly representatives of business and the other two seemed pro-employer. What's been going on in NLRB is typical; it has been true of the regulatory agencies all through Washington. These form the fourth great branch of American government: the administrative police power. Almost unseen and unappreciated by the public a quiet revolution has swept through these regulatory agencies with the advent of the pro-business Eisenhower.

When we came to Washington years ago we naïvely supposed American three-part government was composed of executive, legislative and judiciary. It isn't. It's four parts, and this great fourth part, the agencies and commissions established as watch dogs for the public and consumers, have been quietly put on a leash in the past two years. In almost every case Ike has tipped the ideological balance by appointments (some of them forced) to support his economic philosophy. The process is still going on. Chairman Kuykendall "reorganized" the Federal Power Commission toward what he frankly called "the industry viewpoint." The Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the SEC, the ICC, the Housing and Home Finance Agency (to head which Ike picked lame-duck Rep. Albert Cole (R, Kan.), bitter critic of federal housing) are samples. Pending now is Ike's nominee to head the Federal Communications Commission — John C. McConnaughey—an estimable utility lawyer, picked like Theophil Kammholz to regulate the same business groups which once paid him

You don't really understand what is going on in Washington, we think, unless you appreciate the significance of George Magoffin Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury. We would put him down as the most powerful man in government, after Ike, the man on whose advice Ike leans, probably more than on his brother Milton. Humphrey has called off a couple of wars: said the Treasury couldn't afford them. Wisely or unwisely he is cutting the defense budget. It was he who jolted Dulles and Stassen, first to smother big-scale aid to Latin America, then aid to Asia. Decisions on how much to spend on education and highways feel his gravitational pull. He is a big-featured, strong, attractive man, not afraid of Senators. When it is time to fight Democrats he carries the ball into enemy Congressional committees as he did on taxes last week where we had another chance to watch him. He is not cynical; he believes emotionally that business interests are best for the country; he interprets the world in terms of American private enterprise.

Not for years has the Capital seen anything like this. He came to Washington from Ohio, where he headed the industrial iron-steel-coal empire of the M. A. Hanna Company. And who was this "Hanna"? We turned to our Morison and Commager *Growth of the American Republic* and read:

> Marcus Alonzo Hanna was the last great representative figure of the Ohio dynasty . . . the nearest thing to a national "boss" that ever appeared in this country. Hanna was genuinely convinced that the business interests should govern the country, and he believed ardently in the mission of the Republican Party to promote business activity, whence prosperity would percolate to the farmers and wage-earners below. . . .

Humphrey is no political "boss," but he knows what he wants, has the courage to say it and has the ear of the President.

The United States said "get out" to Metropolitan Boris of the Russian Orthodox Church in America. In quick retaliation the Soviet ordered American priest Bissonnette out of Moscow. . . . Russian farm experts said they would love to come to Iowa to see how we raise corn; Ike at last week's press conference said "he would love to have them come; what a pity it is that our law forbids it." . . . And now the Post Office has told libraries and individuals that it won't deliver copies of Moscow's *Pravda* and *Izvestia* without permits—the third sad illustration in a week of how to lose a propaganda war, and how to encourage an atomic one.

Notes: Republican leaders are telling Ike he can have his Gettysburg dream-farm and still be President again, by taking longer week-ends; he is their indispensable man for victory and they ask, privately, "Why not a 'Gettysburg President'?" . . . Congress gave itself a 50-percent salary increase and is now almost driven to raise federal pay generally, which in turn kicks off the big, multi-billion dollar 1955 wage round for industry as a whole . . . New York Stock Exchange values have risen $60 billion in 18 months; it's naïve to think NYSE heads would call this dangerous to Congress, but most specialists look for a bump ahead.

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

To Run or Not to Run: Everybody Has An Answer

SPECULATION about President Eisenhower's plans for '56 has hardened into firmly held and divergent theories. Opposing camps divide roughly as follows:

First, the pundits—most of the nationally known political reporters agree that the President will run again in '56. Although Eisenhower determinedly ridicules the "indispensable man" theory, the majority of the pundits go along with James Reston's (*New York Times*) recently stated view that like it or not, the President is indispensable to the victory-bent GOP, and that the leaders of the party are not going to let him off the hook. A regular parade of Republican politicians, it is noted, has been trooping to the White House lately, the purpose obviously being to build barricades across all detectable escape routes. And Eisenhower can't do much about it, say the pundits. He cannot state that he will not run without sacrificing what power he has in the Congress and the party. And every time he appears at a GOP meeting—lured there by the barricaders—to exhort the faithful to greater effort in their '56 preparations, he personally adds another section to the fence being built across his path.

Opposed to the pundits are the "intuitives"—this group includes most of the lady politicians and journalists in Washington, D. C. They are equally convinced that '56 will see the Eisenhowers preparing to move into their "dream house" in Gettysburg, Pa.

The rock upon which they base their faith is "Mamie." Mrs. Eisenhower, they say, is adamant on the subject of a second term. She simply will not have it. And the best-substantiated of Washington rumors tend to support this view. George Allen—Eisenhower's bridge and golf crony, and almost never-absent companion—tells friends in the strictest confidence that Mamie has the President's promise not to run again. A former White House aide claims he was fired because he helped Republican National Chairman Leonard Hall load down the President's calendar with visiting GOP heavyweights—all selling a second term.

Further in support of the "intuitives" is the fact that Eisenhower's ridiculing of the "indispensable man" line occurs too frequently not to be calculated. And to the pundit's insistence that Eisenhower *is* indispensable because no one else would be acceptable to both wings of the GOP, the "intuitives" retort that Eisenhower has an ace-in-the-hole—Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Of living Americans, they say, only Warren knows the middle-of-the-road as well as Eisenhower. And he will do whatever the President asks of him. As for party unity and support, the "intuitives" claim that the President recently interrupted an "indispensable man" harangue by one of his Senate leaders with the objection: "I do have an alternative; I have Warren; how would he do?" The Senator, it is said, had to admit he would do very well.

Justice (Anonymous)

THE ADMINISTRATION has unveiled seven rules to implement the stated policy of "fair and impartial treatment" for federal employees under the security risk program. For the most part, these rules are merely old elementary principles made to sound new. They give the employees no more "rights" than they presumably had before. Statements of charges against employees "should be drawn as specifically as possible, consistent with the requirements of national security." In suspending employees, "meticulous care should be exercised" and "a personal interview with the employee prior to suspension is helpful." A legal officer should be present at all hearings, and hearing boards should be composed of persons with "the highest degree of integrity, ability and good judgment." Agency heads should consult with each other to avoid conflicting judgments as to the same individual, *à la* Wolf Ladejinsky. And "every effort should be made to produce witnesses to testify in behalf of the government so long as the production of such witnesses would not jeopardize the national security."

The necessity of reiterating such rudimentary rules at this late date is a testimonial to the low procedural depths to which the Eisenhower security program has fallen. More important is the refusal of the Administration to develop any sensible accommodation between the claims of national security and individual justice. Despite growing Congressional and public pressure, the Administration stands firm on its claim that the program is sound.

Yet there are signs of disagreement within the Administration. The most recent and conspicuous instance is found in the government's brief before the Supreme Court in the pending case against Dr. John T. Peters of the Yale medical faculty, who was dismissed as a Public Health Service consultant on

Let's have a look at those securities

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loyalty grounds. This brief stoutly rejects the notion that federal employees have any right to be confronted with their secret accusers; it argues that the nation's security might be imperilled if such a right were recognized inasmuch as security operations depend greatly upon the anonymity of undercover agents, paid informers and casual informers. Significantly, this brief was signed by Attorney General Brownell but not by Solicitor General Sobeloff, who ordinarily represents the government before the Supreme Court. Sobeloff, who has proved to be one of the best of Eisenhower's appointments, reportedly took the position that waving the flag of national security was not enough to justify refusing to produce one's accusers in each and every instance. And since the secret accuser in the Peters case is said to be the well-known Louis Budenz, Sobeloff maintained that Budenz' anonymity was not necessary in the interests of national security. His conclusion was that the government should confess error, a conclusion firmly overruled by Brownell.

Growing awareness of the present program's inherent injustice is reflected in impending investigations to be headed by Sen. Hubert Humphrey (Minn.) and Sen. Olin Johnston (S.C.) and it has spurred the Ford Foundation's Fund for the Republic to launch a full-scale investigation of the program by a select committee from the Bar Association of the City of New York.

Somebody Has To Buy

BENEATH the admitted and obvious political motivations involved in the fight over whether or not to grant taxpayers a $20 write-off beginning next year lie two fundamentally different conceptions about the sources of this nation's economic strength and consequently about the best way to preserve and stimulate those sources. These opposing views were laid bare in the contrasting testimony before the Senate Finance Committee of Treasury Secretary George Humphrey and of former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, Leon Keyserling.

Humphrey, in a brief statement, said, in part:

> . . . This $20 proposal would give every taxpayer a reduction of $20 for himself, his wife, and each dependent. It would take about five million taxpayers completely off the federal income tax rolls. And it would lose about $2.3 billion of revenue in a full year.
>
> Now, why is this $20 proposal contrary to the public interest? It is contrary to the public interest because it means reversing the successful trend of the Administration during the past two years in cutting deficits and working toward a balanced budget. . . .
>
> This Administration has been slowly getting the government's financial affairs under control to help the economy expand and so make constantly more and better jobs. . . .
>
> The investment of money in tools, plants and equipment which makes jobs has been stimulated. Confidence has increased in the government and in the maintenance of sound policies in the future as well as in the ability of our free economy under such policies constantly to develop more and better jobs, better living and more security for all. The economic gains we are now enjoying are firm evidence of the fact that this confidence is justified.
>
> This proposed tax cut is entirely unjustified by firm evidence at this time. If it is paid out of borrowed money requiring additional deficit financing, which is all that is in sight at this moment, it can start us right back on the reckless road of inflation with all its cruel thievery. . . .
>
> I believe Mr. Keyserling is just 100 percent wrong . . . that is exactly the kind of talk that broke China, that broke France, that broke Germany . . . that is just the kind of talk that has gotten almost everybody else in the world in trouble.

Keyserling, in a larger, more detailed statement, replied, in part (see also "The Prospects for Prosperity in 1955," on page 13):

> . . . it is commonly realized that national tax policy is designed not only to raise revenues, but also to promote economic progress . . . the bigger the pie of our total national output, the bigger will be the revenue yield represented by a tax slice . . . and the better will the economy be able to stand a tax slice of that size. . . . The American economy is operating under conditions of severe slack—the slack in national production, reflecting idle plant and other idle resources besides manpower is serious . . . As of now, the gross national product is about $362 billion, at an annual rate. But if we were fully employing our productive facilities and our labor force it would be above $390 billion.
>
> Manifestly, this $30 billion loss in our annual national product means a loss of several billion dollars in annual tax revenues. . . .
>
> Within a year or so, to restore maximum employment and production, we need to lift personal consumption expenditures by about $16 billion and gross private investment by about $7 billion, at annual rates. If consumption expands sufficiently, the increase in business investment will be forthcoming. . . . The central question of tax policy, therefore, is whether tax reduction should be used to stimulate consumption. In my belief, it most assuredly should. . . .
>
> It is calculated that the tax proposal

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now before the Committee would add less than $1 billion to consumer incomes in the first half of calendar 1956, and only about $2.5 billion at annual rates when its full effects become felt. This is so small a fraction of the expansion of consumption needed to restore maximum employment and production, and to take up the serious slack in the economy, that it is little short of preposterous to say that this proposal has inflationary dangers. How, in the name of reason, can it be inflationary to add $1 billion or so to consumer incomes through tax reductions, when there is now $30 billion of slack in the economy? . .

Certainly, this kind of stimulus to consumption is far preferable, on economic grounds, to the emphasis which the Administration has placed upon stimulating business investment. Business investment, indeed, is important. But most of the stimuli which were offered to business investment through tax concessions last year were wasted. Business investment since then has not grown; it has contracted; and the reason for this is that business investors were suffering not from inadequacy of funds or incentives, but rather from an inadequacy of consumer markets. . . .

When Keyserling finished, Sen. Walter George (D, Ga.), whose opinion carries great weight in the Senate, had this to say:

> Doctor, as I get your basic philosophy, economic philosophy, it is that the true wealth of this Nation is in the profitably employed time of the worker. . . . I agree basically with your philosophy. My great trouble now is that if we are going to undertake any tax policy which will meet the situation ahead of us, it is not in the very hesitant approach made in this [$20 tax cut] bill.

Britain: The "Dog in the Manger" Won't Budge

THE WHOLE climate of British politics changed drastically last week when R. A. Butler, Chancellor of the Exchequer, hoisted economic storm signals by raising the bank rate to 4.5 percent—the highest for a quarter of a century—and imposing severe restrictions on installment buying. The Conservative benches greeted his announcement with glum distaste, while the Labour members went wild with glee.

It does indeed look like the turn of the tide for Labour. For the first three years of the Conservative Government, although production rose only half as much as under Labour and exports virtually stopped rising for the first time since the war, Britain seemed to be booming with prosperity. Over-all consumption increased, despite the fall in living standards for the poorer sections of the population, and the balance of trade and payments seemed to improve steadily. The main reason for this contradiction was an immense improvement in the terms of trade following the sudden deterioration caused by the Korean War. Thanks solely to a relative decline in the cost of imports, Great Britain has been about £500 million a year better off since 1951.

Last November the terms of trade began to move against Britain again for the first time since the Conservatives took office. By now the cost of imports has risen about five percent. Already last year's balance of payments surplus has been wiped out, and the world's reaction is reflected in a softening of sterling, which is now quoted in the transferable account markets at about three percent below the official price. The situation was aggravated by the increase in domestic consumption which the government encouraged, partly for political reasons. In January Butler took the first timid step to cure inflation by raising the bank rate half a percent. This had no effect whatever on the volume of borrowing, so he has now been compelled to raise it another percent to 4.5 percent, and to impose several restrictions on installment buying.

Argument is now raging about the economic wisdom of the government's measures to check a danger which is generally admitted to exist. The Labour Party has never favored big increases in the rate of interest, not only because they impose heavy burdens on the budget and on local authority spending, but also because their immediate effect is on capital investment not current consumption, thereby risking an uncontrollable general slump. *The Economist* has joined Labour in criticizing the new restrictions on installment buying as an unwarrantable interference with freedom of consumer choice.

But overshadowing these arguments about economic technique is the political fact that in a possible election year the tide has turned against the government. For many months now the apparent buoyancy of the national economy and increased consumption among the middle classes who are, perhaps wrongly, believed to provide the bulk of the "floating vote," had convinced Conservative leaders that they could increase their majority by holding an election this year. Already the billboard has been flooded with enormous posters shouting "Conservative Freedom Works" and similar slogans. The government has begun a trickle of concessions to interest groups which was expected to become a torrent in the budget next April.

Now it is difficult to conceive that the economic situation will make it possible for the Chancellor to present a popular budget this Spring. And if the terms of trade continue to deteriorate Britain may be forced back to a new austerity. Thus the Conservatives are thinking less about the Autumn election previously favored and more about a "snap" election in the next few months, before the full weight of the new situation has sunk home in public opinion. But the decision lies as always with the incalculable Prime Minister, who shows no signs whatever of wanting to retire, and many signs of a strengthened concern for world affairs. It has always been assumed that Churchill would not wish to lead a new Conservative government, and it is certain that his colleagues would not wish to be saddled with him for another five-year period. But if he will not withdraw immediately, they may have to try to get him to lead them through and after another general election. He himself is more amused than concerned by their maneuvers. The story is told that before Christmas he was asked if he was going away for the holiday. "No," he growled. "When you're a dog—in the manger—you've got to *stay*—in the manger!" Certainly things are moving to a crisis inside the Conservative Party. It is widely believed that Eden cut short his world tour after the Bangkok Conference not, as was announced, because of Malenkov's removal, but because of Churchill's irremovability.

London DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

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GERALD W. JOHNSON

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The Superficial Aspect

ABOUT THE YEAR 1911 a young man of Abilene left Kansas and entered the United States Military Academy at West Point; whereupon the Olive Drab Curtain closed behind him and cut him off from civilian life for 40 years.

In the special, insulated world of the services he did well—so well indeed that the brilliance of his record is unsurpassed by that of any American soldier. In the end he commanded in successful battle more troops than any other captain of any nation at any time, unless perhaps Genghiz or Xerxes may have led as great a host. So he became the choice of a large majority of the American voters for President of the United States, but in accordance with our traditional system it was necessary for one of the major political parties to nominate him. This led to perplexity, for traditionally an American officer has no politics, so the parties had to inquire. Whereupon he replied, "Of course I am a Republican."

The answer evoked some astonishment in 1952, but certainly it would have caused no comment coming from a young man of Abilene in 1911. In Kansas, in 1911, everyone with punch enough to break a paper bag was a Republican. There, only a year earlier, Roosevelt had launched his famous attack on the Supreme Court—Teddy, of course, in the Osawatomie speech—and there a young man of Topeka named Capper and one of Emporia named White were busily demonstrating that political vigor, vitality and progressiveness were monopolized by Republicans.

True, Kansas in 1911 had fresh memories of Senator Ingalls, whose shirt was first Bloody and then Stuffed, who was also a Republican; but so was his Nemesis, Mary-yellin Lease (actually Mary Elizabeth, if anybody cares). Even Sockless Jerry Simpson, and Peffer, full of solemnity and statistics, were at least part-time Republicans. A party that stretched to cover both Taft and T. R.—the effort was bursting it at the seams, but a young man in Abilene didn't know that—was a party that obviously included everyone who carried a wallop in either fist. It would have been a foolish question to ask of an able young man then and there; of course he was a Republican.

To become a supreme master of the art of war is an absorbing occupation, affording small leisure for the pursuit of outside interests, such as close scrutiny of the development of political philosophies. This makes it easy to believe that it was the information possessed by the young man of Abilene that was voiced by the old soldier of Africa and Normandy and the Rhine.

It explains a great deal if one assumes that the warrior returning to civilian life after 40 years of monastic seclusion of the military world, took it for granted that the parties were as he left them. When asked his affiliation, he may have meant to designate the party of White and Capper and the Rough Rider, the party of vim and drive that had just dethroned Czar Cannon and that was chasing the Money-Changers up telephone poles with all the single-minded devotion of a beagle after a tomcat. Of course he was a Republican. He had courage, hadn't he? And vigor and resolution and dedication to the general welfare?

He should have been a Latinist, at least enough to remember the truth of *tempora mutantur*. As it is, he finds that what he commands is the regiment of Coroebus, wearing the familiar panoply of the illustrious dead, but determined to fight on the wrong side; while it is the Hosts of Hell who are battling for the true, the beautiful and the reciprocal trade treaties. How then shall one measure his perplexity, or point out to him a dignified and adequate way of escape? If the Republican Party had been what it was in Abilene in 1911—ah, but this is Washington in 1955.

ARTISTS and scholars from Thomas Mann to Oppenheimer have demonstrated woefully that one cannot immure himself in an ivory tower for 40 years without a risk that some transvaluation may pass unperceived with a resultant malaise of no small importance. It appears now that one cannot retire to a casemate without incurring the same risk; for political parties are scandalously Protean, and the selfsame label that adhered to the cohorts of LaFollette in 1911 sticks to those of Joe McCarthy today.

It's a sad story, mates, but he who can find moral turpitude in it must himself be unbalanced. As the saying goes, it's just one of those things; and it probably serves no better purpose than to set wiseacres to wagging their heads, repeating that all is not gold that glisters, and pointing out that while Lodge and Knowland both remain Republicans, nobody can be one "of course."

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DISARMING THE ATOM

How Sound Is Churchill's Thesis that Nuclear Weapons May Be an Effective Deterrent to War?

by Michael Straight

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL'S address of March 1 is a major endeavor to grapple with the greatest challenge that confronts the world. Its phrasing, as always, is incomparable. Its courage, in sharing with the public the terrible dilemmas of government, is admirable. Its motivating decision that Britain should construct her own stockpile of nuclear weapons may well be sound and must at least *seem* reassuring to the United States. And yet from its greatest spokesman the Western World might have asked for more.

"There is," said Sir Winston, "an immense gulf between the atomic and the hydrogen bomb. The atomic bomb with all its terror did not carry us outside the scope of human control. . . ." But with the advent of the hydrogen bomb "the entire foundation of human affairs was revolutionized and mankind placed in a situation both measureless and laden with doom."

This appraisal of the "immense gulf" between past and present that was opened in 1954 is certainly sound. It may be, in fact, that the gulf is wider than Sir Winston himself understood. For the remainder of his address seems to be based on the assumption that the new bomb is costly to manufacture and that it will be two to four years before the Soviet Government can accumulate a stockpile of significant size.

If this was Sir Winston's assumption, then the full truth about the weapon detonated on March 1, 1954, must have been withheld from the British Premier as well as from the American people. For if, as an INS dispatch alleges, the March 1 detonation was caused by a weapon in which a hydrogen bomb core was encased in a jacket of refined Uranium 238, then the time of "saturation" is close at hand. In contrast to Uranium 235, U 238 is plentiful, and cheap to produce.

In three or four years, says Sir Winston, "the Soviets will probably stand possessed of hydrogen bombs and the means of delivering them not only on the United Kingdom but also on North American targets." From then on he believes peace will rest on the realization by both sides "that global war would result in mutual annihilation." That realization by both sides, and agreement based upon it is Churchill's supreme objective. What speech then would Churchill make four years hence? It is worth speculating on the nature of that address directed to the challenge of 1960. For the true meaning of the Bikini explosion may be that 1960, as Churchill sees it, is close at hand.

Confronted by mankind's capacity to destroy itself, Churchill surely would develop his opening theme. He would speak for all mankind "laden with doom." He would summon the world to a new effort and see to it that by some means his words reached into Russia and China. He would act in the spirit of Douglas MacArthur who declared in the closing paragraphs of a recent speech at Los Angeles:

> We must have new thoughts, new ideas, new concepts. . . . We must break out of the strait-jacket of the past. There must always be one to lead and we should be that one.

So numbed have we been made by Soviet intransigence that we have developed no concept of arms control since the UN majority plan was allowed to lapse. Hopeful as the plan was in 1947, it is archaic today. Its purpose was to control the facilities that nations *would* construct and the materials they *would* develop. That time has long since passed. A British nuclear physicist, Dr. P. E. Hodgson, records that:

> The most accurate retrospective estimate of the total production of the present separating plants are likely to be in error by several percent and this represents an exceedingly dangerous amount of fissile material. It is therefore necessary to recognize as a basis of all future discussions, that the major powers will possess stocks of fissile material beyond the reach of any proposed International Authority.

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Now, as Sir George Thomson notes in this issue, the remaining hopes of control of weapons have been fragmented by the new bomb. His analysis of the H-bomb is not current, but if he errs it is on the side of conservatism and optimism. A sound appraisal of the Bikini detonation reinforces his pessimistic conclusion that "the possibility of the control of nuclear explosives and the bombs they make has passed."

Since the collapse of the UN majority plan no serious control proposal has been advanced by any nation. In skeleton form a drastic plan for phased disarmament in all weapons was advanced by the British and French governments in June, 1954. Three months later the Soviet government announced that it was prepared to accept the plan "as a basis." Events proved, however, that it was the form of the Anglo-French agenda that the Russians had accepted, and only then for the purpose of rephrasing their traditional proposals for a ban on nuclear weapons without genuine implementation in inspection and control. Now the Soviet line has shifted once again; disarmament is more than ever one weapon of psychological warfare in the Soviet armory, and that warfare has now been renewed by the Kremlin in emphasizing Russia's ability to devastate Britain and Western Europe in nuclear war.

"Disarmament must be real and comprehensive," asserts the British White Paper on Defense of February, 1955. It may be that through the carriers, air, land and sea, of the new weapons, it can still be achieved. Meanwhile time is running out. With too little time—and too much—the British Premier turns elsewhere for his nation's defense. In the deterrent power of the nuclear weapons "well understood by all persons *on both sides* who have the power to control events" he sees some hope for his imperilled island.

PUBLIC discussion of the new weapon is substantially advanced by Churchill's address reproduced in these pages. And yet he leaves substantial questions unanswered. He sees deterrence as a means of halting aggression. But what if war should develop, not by clear aggression but by the "spontaneous combustion" which Douglas MacArthur foresaw? It is after all much more probable in the Far East today. The British Premier affirms in one passage that we must strike paralyzing blows with nuclear weapons "in the first few hours of the next war." Would he then apply his own rule over Formosa? Would he strike at Moscow only, or also at Peking? If disarmament is impracticable then the next line of defense for a world concerned with survival is to limit the weapons used in war. Sir Winston seems to cling to this secondary defense line in insisting that substantial forces must be kept in being, armed with conventional weapons in order to counter a conventional Communist attack. And yet Churchill also holds that "it would be folly to hope that (nuclear weapons) would not be used." When, and for how long would he hold back?

The dilemma is urgent and pressing for the field commanders of NATO; more so than Sir Winston has yet conceded. At SHAPE General Gruenther and Marshal Montgomery insist that tactical atomic weapons will be used from the start. Their reason is given by General Thomas Phillips:

> Since the enemy has atomic weapons our troops must be widely dispersed to minimize losses if they are attacked with those weapons. When they are dispersed to this degree they are spread too widely to make a defense against conventional attack. They have to depend upon the assistance of atomic weapons to break up and disperse the enemy formations. If our troops attack in conventional formations they will be targets of enemy atomic weapons whereas if they attack widely dispersed they must have atomic support to succeed.

In Europe, at least, the decision has probably been made—we will fight with atomic weapons from the start. The same decision will follow a renewal of Communist aggression in Korea. Two experts, Col. George Reinhardt and Lt. Col. William Kintner, argue in the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* that an expressed readiness to use tactical nuclear weapons is necessary militarily on all fronts, and will contribute to the maintenance of peace. And yet the distinction between atomic shells used around a battlefield and superbombs dropped behind the battlefield is not likely to be honored for long in another war.

When that distinction disappears victory will lie with the nation whose civilian population can best absorb the punishment of fallout and blast. And here we come to the weakest aspect of deterrence—civil defense. Our determination that the survivors of a nuclear strike will finish what the whole nation begins is not only a necessity in warfare but a demonstration to the Soviet leaders that we are in earnest. But no such spirit is breathed in the West today. The British White Paper concedes in a triumph of understatement that in the event of nuclear bombing "public morale would be most severely tested." Churchill adds little more. In the one paragraph of his address devoted to civil defense he treats it not as defense and survival, but as Christian charity. Yet Britain, in training her territorial forces and reservists in civil defense, has done more than the United States. The testimony of our Federal Civil Defense Administrator before the Kefauver Subcommittee amounts to a confession of almost total failure under conditions of total neglect. In Western Europe not even a start has been made to prepare for the future that Sir Winston so clearly foresees. Peace may or may not lie in our resolve to rely on nuclear weapons. But only disaster can follow our balmy assumption that while we are delivering these weapons against the peoples who suffer under Communism, their governments will not be unloading them upon us.

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"I find it poignant to look at youth in all its ardor . . ."

Remarks of Sir Winston Churchill before the House of Commons, March 1, on Nuclear Defense Policy

WE LIVE in a period happily unique in human history, when the whole world is divided intellectually and to a large extent geographically between the creeds of Communist discipline and individual freedom, and when at the same time this mental and psychological division is accompanied by the possession by both sides of obliterating weapons of the nuclear age.

We have antagonisms now as deep as those of the Reformation and its reactions, which led to the Thirty Years War. But now they are spread over the whole world instead of only over a small part of Europe. We have to some extent the geographical division of the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, only more ruthless and more thorough. Force and science, hitherto the servants of man, now threaten to become his master.

There is an immense gulf between the atomic and the hydrogen bomb. The atomic bomb, with all its terror, did not carry us outside the scope of human control or manageable events in thought or action, in peace or war. But when Mr. Sterling Cole, the chairman of the United States Congressional [Atomic] Committee, gave out a year ago—February 17, 1954—the first comprehensive review of the hydrogen bomb, the entire foundation of human affairs was revolutionized and mankind placed in a situation both measureless and laden with doom.

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WHAT OUGHT we to do? Which way shall we turn to save our lives and the future of the world? It does not matter so much to old people. They are going soon anyway. But I find it poignant to look at youth in all its activities and ardor, and most of all to watch little children playing their merry games, and wonder what would lie before them if God wearied of mankind.

The best defense would, of course, be bona-fide disarmament all around. This is in all our hearts, but sentiment must not cloud our vision. It is often said that "facts are stubborn things. . . ." We must not conceal from ourselves the gulf between the Soviet Government and the NATO powers, which has hitherto, for so long, prevented an agreement. The long history and tradition of Russia makes it repugnant to the Soviet Government to accept any practical system of international inspection.

A second difficulty lies in the circumstances that, just as the United States, on the one hand, has, we believe, the overwhelming mastery in nuclear weapons, so the Soviets and their Communist satellites have immense superiority in what are called "conventional" forces—the sort of arms and forces with which we fought the last war, but much improved.

The problem is therefore to devise a balanced and phased system of disarmament which at no period enables any one of the participants to enjoy an advantage which might endanger the security of the others.

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UNLESS a trustworthy and universal agreement upon disarmament, conventional and nuclear alike, can be reached and an effective system of inspection is established and is actually working, there is only one sane policy for the free world in the next few years. That is what we call defense through deterrents. This we have already adopted and proclaimed. These deterrents may at any time become the parents of disarmament, provided that they deter. To make our contribution to the deterrent we must ourselves possess the most up-to-date nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them.

Should war come, which God forbid, there are a large number of targets that we and the Americans must be able to strike at once. There are scores of airfields from which the Soviets could launch attacks with hydrogen bombs as soon as they have the bombers to carry them. It is essential to our deterrent policy and to our survival to have, with our American allies, the strength and numbers to be able to paralyze these potential Communist assaults in the first few hours of the war, should it come.

There are also big administrative and industrial targets behind the Iron Curtain, and any effective deterrent policy must have the power to paralyze them all at the outset, or shortly after. There are also the Soviet submarine bases and other naval targets which will need early attention. Unless we make a contribution of our own . . . we cannot be sure that in an emergency the resources of other powers would be planned exactly as we would wish or that the targets which would threaten us most would be given what we consider the necessary priority, or the deserved priority, in the first few hours.

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A VAST quantity of information, some true, some exaggerated, much out of proportion, has been published about the hydrogen bomb. The truth has inevitably been mingled with fiction. . . . I shall content myself with saying about the power of this weapon, the hydrogen bomb, that, apart from all the statements about blast and heat effects over increasingly wide areas, there are now to be considered the consequences of "fallout" as it is called, of wind-borne radioactive particles. There is both an immediate direct effect on human beings who

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"to watch little children playing their merry games . . ."

are in the path of such a cloud and an indirect effect through animals, grass and vegetables, which pass on these contagions to human beings through food.

This would confront many who escaped the direct effects of the explosion with poisoning or starvation or both. Imagination stands appalled. There are, of course, the palliatives and precautions of a courageous civil defense . . . but our best protection lies . . . in successful deterrents operating from a foundation of sober, calm and tireless vigilance.

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HOWEVER, a curious paradox has emerged. Let me put it simply. After a certain point has been passed, it may be said, the worse things get the better. The broad effect of the latest developments is to spread almost indefinitely and at least to a vast extent the area of mortal danger. This should certainly increase the deterrent upon Soviet Russia by putting her enormous spaces and scattered population on an equality, or near equality, of vulnerability with our small, densely populated island and with Western Europe.

I cannot regard this development as adding to our dangers. We have reached the maximum already. On the contrary, to this form of attack continents are vulnerable as well as islands. Hitherto crowded countries, as I have said, like the United Kingdom and Western Europe, have had this outstanding vulnerability to carry. But the hydrogen bomb, with its vast range of destruction and the even wider area of contamination, would be effective also against nations whose population hitherto has been so widely dispersed over large land areas as to make them feel that they were not in any danger at all.

They too become highly vulnerable; not yet equally perhaps, but still highly and increasingly vulnerable. Here again we see the value of deterrents, immune against surprise and well understood by all persons on both sides—repeat, on both sides—who have the power to control events. That is why I have hoped for a long time for a top-level conference where these matters could be put plainly and bluntly from one friendly visitor to the conference to another.

Then it may well be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.

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ACCORDING TO the information that I have been able to obtain—I have taken every opportunity to consult all the highest authorities at our disposal—the only country which is able to deliver today a full-scale nuclear attack with hydrogen bombs at a few hours' notice is the United States. That surely is an important fact, and from some points of view and to some of us it is not entirely without comfort.

It is conceivable that Soviet Russia, fearing a nuclear attack before she has caught up with the United States and created deterrents of her own, as she might argue that they are, might attempt to bridge the gulf by a surprise attack with such nuclear weapons as she has already. American superiority in nuclear weapons, reinforced by Britain, must therefore be so organized as to make it clear that no such surprise attack would prevent immediate retaliation on a far larger scale. This is an essential of the deterrent policy.

For this purpose, not only must the nuclear superiority of the Western powers be stimulated in every possible way, but their means of delivery of bombs must be expanded, improved and varied. . . . I will not attempt to go into details, but it is known that bases have been and are being established in as many parts of the world as possible and that over all rests the United States Strategic Air Force, which is in itself a deterrent of the highest order and is in ceaseless readiness. The Soviet Government probably knows in general terms of the policy that is being pursued, and of the present United States strength and our own growing addition to it.

Thus, they should be convinced that a surprise attack could not exclude immediate retaliation. As one might say to them: Although you might kill millions of our peoples, and cause widespread havoc by a surprise attack, we could, within a few hours of this outrage, certainly deliver several, indeed many times, the weight of nuclear material which you have used, and continue retaliation on that same scale. We have, we could say, already hundreds of bases for attack from all angles and have made an intricate study of suitable targets.

Thus, it seems to me, with some experience of wartime talks, you might go to dinner and have a friendly evening. I should not be afraid to talk things over as far as they can be. This, and the hard facts, would make the deterrent effective.

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ALL THESE considerations lead me to believe that, on a broad view, the Soviets would be ill-advised to embark on major aggression within the next three or four years. . . . If, at the end of that time, there should be a supreme conflict, the weapons which I have described this afternoon would be available to both sides, and it would be folly to suppose that they would not be used. Our precautionary dispositions and preparations must therefore be based on the assumption that, if war should come, those weapons would be used.

In three or four years' time—it may be even less—the scene will be changed. The Soviets will probably stand

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"What would lie before them if God wearied of mankind."

possessed of hydrogen bombs and the means of delivering them not only on the United Kingdom but also on North American targets. They may then have reached a stage not indeed of parity with the United States and Britain but of what is called "saturation."

I must explain this term of art. "Saturation" in this connection means the point where although one power is stronger than the other—perhaps much stronger—both are capable of inflicting crippling or quasi-mortal injury on the other with what they have got. It does not follow, however, that the risk of war will then be greater. Indeed, it is arguable that it will be less, for both sides will then realize that global war would result in mutual annihilation.

Major war of the future will differ therefore from anything we have known in the past, in this one significant respect that each side at the outset will suffer what it dreads the most—the loss of everything that it has ever known. The deterrents will grow continually in value. In the past an aggressor has been tempted by the hope of snatching an early advantage. In future, he may be deterred by the knowledge that the other side has the certain power to inflict swift, inescapable and crushing retaliation.

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OF COURSE, we should all agree that a world-wide international agreement on disarmament is the goal at which we should aim. The Western democracies disarmed themselves at the end of the war. The Soviet Government did not disarm, and the Western nations were forced to rearm, though only partially, after the Soviets and Communists had dominated all China and half Europe. That is the present position. It is easy, of course, for the Communists to say now, "Let us ban all nuclear weapons." Communist ascendancy in conventional weapons would then become overwhelming. That might bring peace but only peace in the form of the subjugation of the free world to the Communist system.

The hydrogen bomb has made an astounding incursion into the structure of our lives and thoughts. Its impact is prodigious and profound, but I do not agree with those who say, "Let us sweep away forthwith all our existing defense services and concentrate our energy and resources on nuclear weapons and their immediate ancillaries." The policy of the deterrent cannot rest on nuclear weapons alone. We must, together with our NATO allies, maintain the defensive shield in Western Europe.

Unless the NATO powers had effective forces there on the ground and could make a front, there would be nothing to prevent piecemeal advance and encroachment by the Communists in this time of so-called peace. By successive infiltrations the Communists would progressively undermine the security of Europe. Unless we were prepared to unleash a full-scale nuclear war as soon as some local incident occurs in some distant country, we must have conventional forces in readiness to deal with such situations as they arise. . . . Substantial strength in conventional forces has still a vital part to play in the policy of the deterrent. It is perhaps of even greater importance in the Cold War.

Though world war may be prevented by the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, the Communists may well resort to military action in furtherance of their policy of infiltration and encroachment in many parts of the world. There may well be limited wars on the Korean model, with limited objectives. We must be able to play our part in these, if called upon by the United Nations Organization. In the conditions of today, this is also an aspect of our Commonwealth responsibility. We shall need substantial strength in conventional forces to fulfill our world-wide obligations in these days of uneasy peace and extreme bad temper.

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THERE ARE those who believe, or at any rate say: If we have the protection of the overwhelmingly powerful United States, we need not make the hydrogen bomb for ourselves or build a fleet of bombers for its delivery. We can leave that to our friends across the ocean. Our contribution should be criticism of any unwise policy into which they may drift or plunge. We should throw our hearts and consciences into that.

Personally, I cannot feel that we should have much influence over their policy or actions, wise or unwise, while we are largely dependent, as we are today, upon their protection. We too must possess substantial deterrent power of our own. We must also never allow, above all, I hold, the growing sense of unity and brotherhood between the United Kingdom and the United States and throughout the English-speaking world to be injured or retarded. Its maintenance, its stimulation and its fortifying is one of the first duties of every person who wishes to see peace in the world and wishes to see the survival of this country.

To conclude . . . there is time and hope if we combine patience and courage. All deterrents will improve and gain authority during the next 10 years. By that time the deterrent may well reach its acme and reap its final reward. The day may dawn when fair play, love of one's fellow men, respect for justice and freedom, will enable tormented generations to march forth serene and triumphant from the hideous epoch in which we have to dwell. Meanwhile, never flinch, never weary, never despair!

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Out of Control

by Sir George Thomson

IN THE LONG and dreary history of the attempts to reach international agreement on the control of atomic energy, the brightest gleam shone in the autumn of 1946 when a report was signed by all, including the representatives of the USSR, which contained the words: "We do not find any basis in the available scientific facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically feasible." The scheme variously known as the Lilienthal and the Baruch Plan considered in very considerable detail a control of atomic energy based fundamentally on the raw materials expected to be used—uranium and thorium, though in fact at the time the use of thorium was only a possibility. It was proposed to control uranium right from the mine, the degree of control increasing as the process advanced. Certain stages were to be inspected by the proposed international authority; others, the more advanced, were to be managed or, as the United States representatives strongly claimed, actually owned by it. There is little doubt that if the scheme had been accepted and honestly administered, it would have worked in the conditions of 1946.

There are two reasons why it would not now be possible, even with full agreement of all interested parties, to establish a control which would make the clandestine possession of bombs impossible. The first is the large number of bombs of the uranium-plutonium type which are almost certainly in the possession of both the USA and the USSR. No doubt these countries have full records of the amount of fissionable material which they have in fact produced, but no one except the most trusted officials of the countries concerned has ever seen them. It would be possible to falsify them so as to show a smaller yield of material from piles and separating plants than was in fact the case. It is fissionable (explosive) material that counts rather than actual bombs. Once the technique of making them has been worked out, the bomb cases could be made almost anywhere; one could never be sure that all copies of a blueprint had been destroyed. It is doubtful if even an occupying army, like that of Germany, could be certain of proving the fraud, still less of finding the missing material. Certainly no degree of inspection that a sovereign power could be expected to tolerate would stand much chance.

The other difficulty concerns the hydrogen bomb. This is made primarily from deuterium, the heavy isotope of hydrogen which occurs to the extent of one part in 7,000 in hydrogen wherever it is. The most important source is, of course, water. Here there can be no question of the control of the raw material. The separation is a matter of some difficulty and requires a good deal of power. Theoretically its production could be controlled, but it is not necessary, though it is convenient, to use large plants. To be sure that it was not being made clandestinely would involve the inspection of all factories down to quite a small size. It seems hardly probable that any great country, least of all the USSR, would agree to such an infringement of privacy and risk loss of commercial, not to say military, secrets.

It is believed that bombs of the uranium-plutonium type are used as a kind of detonator to set the deuterium off. If so, there is a theoretical possibility of control, but it is a very poor one. In the first place, the leakage of even two or three U-bombs would become extremely serious because of the multiplication of their effect, as each could be the center of an H-bomb; but, worse still, there are rumors that it may be possible to dispense with the U-bomb as a detonator. Obviously it would be folly to put an international matter of this importance at the mercy of an uncertain point of technology. Even if the rumors are false now, there can be no confidence that they will remain so. Some at least of the H-bombs have contained lithium. This element, though not common, is fairly widely distributed in traces. It does not, I think, provide a possible means of control. Not merely is there plenty of it in most large countries, but the amount needed is relatively small—only, in fact, what is actually used in the bomb; while in the case of uranium, quantities of the order of a hundred tons might be required for a pile, though the amount of plutonium needed for an individual bomb is enormously less. Further, although lithium is probably a convenience, there is no reason to suppose it essential.

ONE final possibility is control through tritium. This third unstable isotope of hydrogen is believed to form part of the detonator of the hydrogen bomb. Being unstable, it has to be made for the purpose; it is most readily made in a pile similar to, or identical with, those used to make plutonium. It has never been disclosed how much is needed; it may be a small amount. There may here be a faint possibility of control; to examine it one would need access to highly classified information. On general grounds the idea is not attractive. Apart from the fact that it would probably not be difficult to conceal one plant, or even perhaps to make the needed amount after a declaration of war in piles normally used for making commercial and medical isotopes, it is undesirable to make control rest on a single minor constituent; one can never feel sure that an improvement in technique will not make it unnecessary.

For these reasons it seems that the possibility of the control of nuclear explosives and the bombs they make has passed.

Sir George Thomson of the Imperial College of Science, Chairman of the first British Committee on Atomic Energy, has won the Nobel Prize for physics.

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

The Prospects for Prosperity in 1955

Leon Keyserling analyzes where we shall be a year from now if we follow present policies, and what the US needs and can afford for a fully productive economy

In some underdeveloped areas overseas which have become crucial to the future of freedom, hundreds of millions of people toil with scant means which make it hard to maintain a bare standard of living and to resist Communist encroachment. In sharp contrast, the United States now possesses an immense reservoir of idle men and other productive strength, pleading to be used to meet our needs. Between now and the end of this year, we can bring more than 2½ million unemployed and new workers—the most skilled and productive in the world—into the stream of usefulness. We can, without inflationary strain, expand our total output for 1955 at least 6 percent above 1954, and by the fourth quarter of this year lift it to about 8 percent, or about $30 billion at an annual rate, above current levels. If we unsheathe fully the great non-secret weapon of our economic strength, we can more adequately and more easily serve our domestic needs and world responsibilities—and also balance the Federal Budget.

But our current national economic policies are not well adjusted to the full use of this great non-secret weapon. These policies seem geared to the objectives, "optimistically" described, of advancing our total output this year by only about 3 percent above last year. This would be far short of the expansion needed to keep up with a growing productivity and labor force. With such limited growth, the true level of unemployment—which includes both full-time unemployment and its part-time equivalent—would be likely to rise from about 4 million in 1954 as a whole to about 5 million in 1955 as a whole, with a considerably higher level by the year's end. That would leave us, even at the end of the year, with an annual rate of output nearly $20 billion below the full production level.

Moreover, it is doubtful whether under existing policies and programs we would register even a 3-percent rate of growth for this year. Farm personal income, so essential to national prosperity, is being pushed further downward, despite a 20-percent reduction since 1951 and a per-capita income for farmers averaging only about one-third that of other citizens. Auto production, the mainspring of the recent "upturn," is scheduled to decline later this year. Business investment in plant and equipment is not expanding, small business is losing ground, and consumer incomes are not rising sufficiently. Public policies, instead of being adjusted upward to furnish the stimuli required for a full economy, are mainly being reduced downward to mesh with a stagnant or retarded economy.

National security and international economic assistance, already severely slashed, are being compressed further in the face of serious world difficulties. With the shortage in educational facilities already a national disgrace and becoming a national menace, the federal government which alone has the resources to meet most of this deficit has thus far proposed only a strikingly inadequate stop-gap. Vast health needs are being countered by an assumption that some new way can be found to pay for better health without really spending money. Natural resource developments, for conservation and power, highways and water supply, are being driven further downward, although they are already far below the requirements for national security, population growth and private industrial development. Old-age insurance is being held to levels which furnish our senior citizens only about one-third of the cost of a decent standard of living, and unemployment insurance protection is so weak that close to 2 million of those unemployed in 1954 exhausted their benefits. Minimum wage proposals are not even keeping up with changes in living costs; much less with economic growth. With about one-third of all American families living in substandard housing, there is

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Economist Keyserling, one year ago, refused to accept the more gloomy prophecies of many distinguished economists then predicting that a serious post-war depression in the United States was "just around the corner." In his article of January 4, 1954 in the *New Republic,* Mr. Keyserling took exception to the pessimistic views of Australian economist Colin Clark, and said that in his judgment there was "only one chance in 10 that there will be a serious downturn."

"Balancing the favorable factors against the unfavorable factors," he wrote, "there might be some justification for the extreme pessimism of Mr. Clark and others, if one were looking merely at a page of statistics and neglecting the imponderable factors in the American economy which many times since World War II have confounded the extreme pessimists. The most important of these imponderables is that the future of our economy will not be determined by rigid mathematical deviations from the statistics of yesterday, but rather by the human actions which we take in response to the evolving problems of today and tomorrow."

practically no rebuilding of slums, and without this the housing "boom" may be near the saturation point.

Efforts to give the financial account of the government priority over the economic account of the country put second things first; in addition, they are self-defeating because the customary Federal Budget is not and cannot be balanced in an unbalanced economy without taking domestic and international risks which quite properly no one should take. In calendar 1954, the federal deficit was about $4 billion; in this calendar year, the prospective deficit is estimated at about $3.5 billion.

Instead of spiraling the servicing of our domestic and international needs downward in a resigned attitude toward high unemployment and slack production, the practical goal is to bring forth, by the end of this year, the more than 2½ million new jobs and the almost $30 billion (8 percent) increase in the annual rate of total output, needed for full employment and almost full production.

To expand consumption, which is at the core of prosperity in relative peacetime, the personal-income-tax exemptions should be raised by about $200, furnishing about $4.5 billion of additional purchasing power. The minimum wage law should be raised to $1.25 and coverage expanded, which by the end of this year might add another $2.5 billion to purchasing power. Further to stimulate production and jobs, the annual average level of federal outlays for this calendar year, in the conventional Budget, should be raised about $3.5 billion above those now contemplated, which in a much expanded economy would still be $6.75 billion below the 1953 level. Gradual expansion, to achieve the higher average for the year as a whole than now contemplated, could by the fourth quarter of this year add about $3 billion, stated at annual rates, to outlays for national security and international aid; about $750 million toward the restoration of agriculture; about a billion dollars toward improved education and about $300 million toward improved health; and about $1 billion toward the protection and expansion of our natural resources base, including public works.

Old-age-insurance-benefit payments by the fourth quarter of this year should be increased by about a billion dollars at annual rates, and unemployment insurance should be greatly strengthened; these changes would not result in higher Federal Budget costs because of their method of financing, but they would add greatly to consumer buying by enlarging the receipts of low-income families, who spend a larger part of what they receive. And it is recommended that the government undertake to lift the annual rate of slum clearance and low-rent housing to an annual rate of between 300 thousand and 500 thousand units by the end of this year. The subsidy cost of this to the government would be only a few million dollars annually in the first year, but no other single measure would add so much toward re-employment and business stimulation through the channels of enterprise.

THIS program is entirely consistent with the purpose of the Employment Act of 1946 that maximum employment, production and purchasing power be combined with the preservation of free competitive enterprise. The program deals with traditional programs, but expands them to match our needs and productive abilities. A rise in the annual rate of federal spending above current levels by about $6 billion by the fourth quarter of this year would be accomplished by a rise of almost $30 billion in our total national product. Due to vast re-employment and appropriate wage increases, the annual rate of wage and salary income would rise by more than $15 billion. The annual rate of consumer spending—and consequently of business sales to consumers—would rise by about $16 billion. The annual rate of farm personal income, to make up for the gross disparities in farm income, would rise by about $4 billion; and expanded consumption of food and clothing, plus exports to underdeveloped areas, would cut deeply into farm "surpluses." The annual rate of total business investment would rise by about $6.5 billion; exclusive of inventory change, it would rise by about 2½ billion. Corporate profits would rise by at least $2.5 billion. The people of America would not only produce and consume more; they would also save about $3 1/3 billion more at annual rates.

With this balanced economic expansion on all fronts, federal spending under the customary Budget would

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drop from 20.2 percent of total national output in calendar 1953 to 17.7 percent in calendar 1955. With a base established for even more solid economic progress in 1956, a balanced Federal Budget in a balanced economy would result by the end of that calendar year.

We should embrace the concept of a *national prosperity budget*, which would blend in just proportion our common needs and capabilities in a full employment and full production program for all. Aside from the benefits to our national economy and our national security, this would stress the great moral values which weigh most in a democracy. It would bring the American people to an appreciation of the great things which bind us together instead of the small things which divide us; it would place the things we can achieve above the things we should not fear; it would range the things we must afford above the things we have erroneously come to believe we cannot afford; it would substitute for a sword hanging above our heads the great non-secret weapon of our productive genius and capacity for progress when we pull together in practical pursuit of common goals.

The Need for Growth

When the American economy is healthy, its productivity—the output of each worker for each hour worked—grows from year to year with more tools and better skills. In addition to this increasing production by each employed worker, full employment means more employment from year to year, because of population growth. Adding together the growth in output per worker and the growth in employment, each succeeding year of full employment means a vast increase in total production. Because of productivity growth, the growth in total production is much faster than the growth in population.

For sustained full employment and full production, the total buying power of the people, as consumers, investors and through government, must therefore rise as rapidly as the growth in the number of people wanting jobs, plus the growth in productivity. The standard of living must rise about as fast as the growth in our ability to produce exceeds the growth in our population, except when we use a lot of the increased production for war. More leisure—shorter working hours and improved retirement plans—while highly desirable, can absorb only a part of our growing power to produce.

In early 1953 our potential for annual growth in productivity in a full economy was at least 3.7 percent. In addition, the growth in the civilian labor force, unless lack of opportunity prevents numerous people from looking for work, should be about 1.5 percent a year (including presently reducing levels of the armed forces). We should allow for a reduction of about 0.7 percent a year in the number of hours work per week by those fully employed, in line with current expectations. Thus, the growth in the labor force should, with full employment, add about 0.8 percent a year to the total number of hours worked by everybody. Combining productivity and labor force, the economy needed to expand by at least 4.5 percent a year in 1953 and 1954 to maintain full employment and full production.

This would have lifted the annual rate of our total output from $361.8 billion in the first quarter of 1953 to about $391 billion in the fourth quarter of 1954. Instead, actual output in the fourth quarter of 1954 was only $361 billion, according to preliminary estimates, or about $30 billion lower than needed for full employment and full production. Over the two-year period, the actual drop in total output was insignificant. But it was immense when measured against the imperative need for growth. This explains the rising tide of unemployment.

The Unemployment Picture

The most vivid and painful fact in American economic life today is that unemployment is far too high, by any standard that decent people will accept. It has not yet been substantially reduced. It threatens to rise. The recent and widely publicized business upturn is encouraging. But it has not yet given satisfactory signs of endurance, nor made much headway for the economy as a whole. And in areas where increases in production have been most pronounced in recent months, more goods are being turned out by the same number of workers—or by even fewer workers. We are headed for an increase in hard-core unemployment, unless general economic expansion gets into high gear on a hard road; it is now in low gear on a soft surface.

Total employment in 1954 averaged about one million lower than in 1953, and more than 450 thousand lower than in 1952. It was higher than in still earlier years.

LEON H. KEYSERLING, President of the Conference on Economic Progress, the non-political organization for economic research and education which sponsored this study, last served the US Government as Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers from 1950 until his resignation in 1953. He also served as the Council's first Vice-Chairman from its inception in 1946 to 1950.

Beginning with the first year of the New Deal, Mr. Keyserling served as assistant to former Senator Robert Wagner and as a staff member of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, then as Deputy and Acting Administrator of the Housing Authority, and during World War II, as General Counsel of the National Housing Agency. He helped to write the National Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Law, the Employment Act of 1946 and the Wagner-Ellender-Taft postwar housing legislation.

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By this superficial test, 1954 was the third best year on record. But with about ¾ million more people needing jobs every year, if employment in any year is not correspondingly *higher* than in the preceding year, we are just that much worse off. By this proper test, 1954 was not the third best year on record, but a bad year indeed.

This is why full-time unemployment, as shown by the official figures of the Census Bureau, rose from 1.6 million in 1953 to more that 3.2 million in 1954. It rose from about 2.5 percent to 5 percent of the civilian labor force.

But this is not the whole story. For example, if 100 men get a 10 percent reduction in hours due to slack production, it should be counted as the equivalent of 10 men unemployed full time. If 12 men are temporarily laid off for one month, it should be counted as the equivalent of one year of full-time unemployment for one man. The true level of unemployment—expressed in this common denominator of full-time unemployment—rose from about 1.8 million in 1953 to about 4.1 million in 1954, an increase of more than 120 percent. It rose from 2.9 percent to 6.3 percent of the civilian labor force.

By the fourth quarter of 1954, a 7½ percent deficit in total output below the full production level was accompanied by excess unemployment amounting to about 3½ percent of the full employment level of employment. The essential reason for this seeming discrepancy is plain: In addition to revealed unemployment, millions of workers were being inefficiently used—in agriculture, in trade, in service industries, and in other areas of the economy where their full experience and capabilities were not drawn forth and, generally, their earnings were reduced.

THE latest monthly figures for 1954 show a slight decline both in employment and unemployment, due to seasonal shrinkage in the labor force. The December level of employment was slightly lower than a year earlier, and more than a million below two years earlier. In December, full-time unemployment somewhat above 2.8 million was about the same as in November, higher than in October, about one million higher than a year earlier, and about 1.4 million higher than two years earlier. Seasonally adjusted, full-time unemployment in December, 1954, was about 3 million, and the true level of unemployment about 3.7 million.

The unemployment picture in the most recent months is further darkened by unfavorable developments in important parts of the economy. Although in the fourth quarter of 1954 manufacturing employment was about 250 thousand higher than in the third quarter, this was due largely to the upswing in new-model auto production and in steel. Extended maintenance of this upswing is highly unlikely, as will be discussed shortly. Moreover, there was practically no improvement in manufacturing



employment from month to month during the fourth quarter.

This has startling implications. A sizable increase in production has been accomplished without comparable increases in employment, due mostly to technological advance. Considering manufacturing, mining, and construction together, production in the fourth quarter of 1954 was higher than in the fourth quarter of 1953, but employment was down more than one million, or more than 5 percent. What is going to happen when fully automatic production, popularly called "automation," accelerates this advance in technology, while the labor force continues to grow? Is still more of the "surplus" labor supply to be kept on the farm or sent to the farm? How many more workers can find jobs in trade and service industries and in nondescript part-time jobs, how fast, for how long, and at what pay?

An upturn in business activity can be accompanied by no improvement in the job situation—or even a worsening—if the upturn is not big and enduring enough (a) to reduce unemployment, and (b) to keep up with further growth in productivity and in the labor force. This is why the upturn in recent months has not made large inroads upon unemployment. In the fourth quarter of 1954, the annual rate of total output was only about 1½ percent higher than the fairly stationary annual rate during the first three quarters. It remained about 2½ percent below the annual rate a year and a half earlier, and about 7½ percent below the annual rate which would have been required for full employment by the fourth quarter of 1954 if the growth consistent with a full economy had been carried forward steadily from early 1953.

Some continuation of the business upturn is expected. But if our total national output in 1955 should be better than in 1954, but the same as 1953—"the best year on record"—the level of true unemployment for 1955 as a whole might well exceed 5 million, with a lower level of

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full-time unemployment due to the sharing of part-time and temporary unemployment in the 1954 manner.

If the level of total output in 1955 should be 3 percent above 1954, as recently predicted "optimistically" by the head of our largest industrial corporation, this would not be nearly enough to take up the current slack in employment, and to absorb productivity and new workers. The level of true unemployment for 1955 as a whole might well average around 5 million, with a somewhat lower level of full-time unemployment.

To restore full employment and reasonably full production by the end of 1955, the level of total output would need to reach an annual rate, in the fourth quarter of the year, more than 8 percent above the level in the fourth quarter of 1954. For 1955 as a whole, it would need to be in the neighborhood of 6 percent above 1954 as a whole. The key problem is to get the expansion of output required to restore full employment by the end of 1955. So we turn now to examine our national economic deficit in output, and how to remove it.

Our Economic Deficits

In 1953, our total output was $3 billion below the full economy level, and in 1954 about $27.4 billion too low. In the two years together, the loss was about $30 billion. In the fourth quarter of 1954 despite some business upturn, the deficit at an annual rate of about $30 billion was as big as the combined deficit for the past two years. The deficit grows, not only when output stands still or falls backward, but also when it does not expand enough to keep up with advancing productivity and a growing labor force.

Whether measured as what we have lost in two years, or as the annual rate of loss now, a national economic deficit of $30 billion is equivalent to more than $575 for every family unit in the United States. It has meant an annual wage and salary loss for the whole economy of at least $15 billion; a loss of about $3 billion in agricultural personal incomes; a loss of about $5 billion in corporate profits, with a much higher relative rate of loss by small business. It has drawn down the accumulated savings of millions of families, and swelled the debts of millions of families who have no savings at all. And it has meant a very heavy loss in federal revenues.

Another way of measuring the loss is to translate it into an equivalent value of goods and services, representing some of our most urgent national needs. One-sixth of $30 billion worth of productive human effort—lying idle in a recessionary period—would be equivalent to the cost of replacing about one million urban and rural slums with an American standard of housing; the same one-sixth would approximate the requirements per year to build up our defenses against sneak air attack, at rates which most of the experts urge but which others say our economy "cannot afford." One-fifteenth of this amount would be enough to make significant inroads upon the problem of inadequate medical care for millions of American families—hospitals, doctors, nurses. One-thirtieth of this amount would be enough to increase the salaries of a million teachers by $1,000 a year; and one-third of this amount would be enough to eliminate the present backlog of needed classrooms in elementary and high schools. One-tenth of this amount would be more than the annual average of our economic assistance to other free peoples since World War II, toward an improved standard of living and to protect themselves against Communist aggression or subversion.

These examples do not mean that this is how we would or should use this $30 billion worth of annual product—if we were not losing it. That would be determined freely by a free people, as consumers and as citizens. Nor would most of these uses be in the form of public spending; most of them would involve consumer spending and business investment. But we can all agree that an annual $30 billion national economic deficit, in view of our vast needs and wants, is intolerable.

Part II of this article, next week, will detail what specific programs are needed to produce prosperity for 1955 and the future.

The 66-page pamphlet, of which this 2-part article is a condensation, can be obtained for 35¢ from the Conference on Economic Progress, 1001 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Washington 6, D. C.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

by Bernard Meltzer

DEAN GRISWOLD'S small book, *The Fifth Amendment Today*, fortunately preserves three valuable speeches which he made in 1954, on the currently troublesome issues of freedom and security. They deal with the privilege against self-incrimination and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and with procedural abuses in some Congressional investigations, loyalty proceedings, and criminal trials. Although they do not mention Senator McCarthy's name, they involve a criticism of his methods. The two speeches on the privilege, which will be my primary concern here, are a timely corrective against wild statements which have confused the public and have degraded the privilege and those who claim it.

The Dean presents an eloquent and appealing case for the privilege against self-incrimination as an institution and a humane plea against automatic condemnation of those who claim it. This privilege, in the Dean's words, "is one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized." It is a "symbol of our best aspirations and our deep-seated sense of justice." "The establishment of the privilege is closely linked historically with the abolition of torture." The privilege reflects the "inherent cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own guilt." "Another purpose behind the privilege is to protect the innocent." A witness asked about his past or present Communist affiliations may, in some circumstances, properly invoke the privilege without ever having been a Communist. Instead of reflecting wrongdoing,

> . . . the claim of privilege may in fact be largely a reflection of the kind of hearing to which [claimants] have been subjected and thus in reality something which should bear heavily against those who are branding them as Fifth-Amendment Communists.

The Fifth Amendment Today, by Erwin N. Griswold (Harvard; cloth, $2; paper, 50c).

The Dean himself notes some qualifications of his appealing argument (which I have inadequately summarized). But he generally attaches less importance to these qualifications than seems to me appropriate.

There are passages in Supreme Court opinions which give the privilege the high stature accorded to it by Dean Griswold. The Court's decisions in practice, however, have not fulfilled the promise of its rhetoric. The Court, for example, declined to impose the privilege on the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the reason that it did not consider the privilege one of the "principles of ordered liberty" essential to a free society. Individual justices, such as Mr. Justice Hughes and Cardozo, not unfriendly to personal freedom, have voiced their skepticism about the utility of the privilege. It is also interesting that none of the great English charters, such as Magna Carta or the Bill of Rights, contained a guaranty of the privilege.

Dean Griswold's high estimate seems to result in part from what seems to me an overemphasis on the connection between the recognition of the privilege and the abolition of torture. It is true that the privilege was recognized as a result of John Lilburne's stiff-necked resistance in the seventeenth century to the Court of Star Chamber, and that the Star Chamber's procedures included both interrogation under oath and the torture of those who refused to answer. It is true also that in the American colonies the privilege was sometimes viewed as a protection against torture. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of the privilege appears to have been protection against compulsion to testify under oath and not against torture.

More important than this still somewhat obscure history in a discussion of the "Fifth Amendment Today" is the present difference in the purpose of the privilege and of the rules excluding confessions secured by torture and similar tactics. As Wigmore, the acknowledged master of the law of evidence, put it, "the confession rules aim to exclude self-incriminating statements which are *false*, while the privilege gives the option of excluding those which are *true*." Indeed, students of the privilege, beginning with Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century, have properly warned against confusing the interrogation room with a torture chamber. This admonition, even though it has sometimes been ignored by the Supreme Court, helps in the search for a meaningful explanation for the existence of the privilege today.

Dean Griswold refers us to Mr. Justice Field's explanation: "The essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own guilt is obvious to every one, and needs no illustration." The "cruelty" of compulsory interrogation under oath generally results from the fact that such compulsion gives the suspect, whose answers would be incriminating, a set of harsh choices: perjury and the risk of temporal, and for the religious, divine, punishment; self-incrimination; or silence and punishment for contempt. It was the harshness of these choices which Lilburne suggested in opposing interrogation under oath by the Court of Star Chamber. "This oath," he said, "is against the very law of nature; for nature is always a preserver of itself, not a destroyer; but if a man takes this wicked oath, he destroys and undoes himself."

Now it is important that generally it is not the innocent who are undone by taking an oath, or who are confronted with oppressive choices when interrogated under oath. Thus historians generally acknowledge that the early claimants of the privilege were guilty of violating the law. We heroize them now, not because they were innocent, but because they violated "bad" laws. And it may well be that modern claimants are generally no more innocent than their seventeenth century predecessors. This is not to say that the innocent never invoke the privilege, a matter examined more fully below. It is to say that the argument that the privilege is designed

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both to protect the innocent and to prevent the cruelty of compulsory self-condemnation is not altogether consistent.

The explanation of the privilege as a shield against oppressive choices I find the most acceptable general explanation. It is consistent not only with the early history of the privilege but also with experience which suggests that denial is the usual response of the innocent to unfounded charges. This explanation is, however, not a comfortable one. It offends our puritan susceptibilities, which prefer the notion that every constitutional protection operates primarily to protect the innocent. This view of the privilege is also vulnerable to Bentham's gibe, "an old woman's reason," *i.e.,* a sentimental one which does not justify depriving the state of uniquely valuable evidence. Nevertheless, this explanation is one which makes the privilege a more, rather than a less, powerful symbol of our system's respect for the dignity of the individual. The best measure of our humaneness may well be our treatment to those who are actual or likely sinners rather than our treatment of the innocent.

Whatever the true explanation for the privilege, the law has generally declared that in criminal cases the privilege and related doctrines permitting the accused to be silent are designed to protect the innocent and that the claim is not to be treated as evidence of wrongdoing. Many critics have attacked, and a few states have rejected, this approach, as nullifying common sense. But the issue here cuts deeper than the evidentiary meaning of the defendant's silence in a criminal trial. The basic issue is one of the policy to govern a criminal trial, and the governing policy—tenderness toward the accused—has overridden a purely logical approach to the meaning of a claim. It is this policy which also accounts for the so-called presumption of innocence in criminal trials, which again scarcely reflects the probabilities.

The law plays the privilege differently where non-criminal cases are involved. Thus in civil cases and in administrative hearings involving serious consequences, like deportation, the claim of privilege has sometimes been treated as evidence of wrongdoing. A distinguished former federal judge, Simon Rifkind, has criticized such playing of the privilege both ways. But this criticism seems to ignore the fact that sometimes the law operates, and should operate, according to the probabilities, and at other times according to policies which override the probabilities. Indeed, the law stands the probabilities on their head. It seeks to ban the adverse inference in a criminal case where the defendant's silence after a *prima facie* case has been made against him has considerable probative force. But in other contexts, where silence is less persuasive, the law does not attempt to guard against such an inference.

When we move from adversary litigation directed at reaching a formal verdict to other processes, such as Congressional investigations or the formation of public opinion, or the reaction of prospective employers, the law does not, and cannot, supply a rule governing the meaning of a claim of the privilege. The "rule" here is logic, probability, or more simply, common sense.

In public discussion of the meaning of a claim of privilege, two extreme views have been expressed, both of which, in my judgment, are unsound. One such view is that the claim of the privilege is meaningless as proof of wrongdoing, and that the claimant should be judged for all purposes as if he had not refused to answer questions on the ground of possible self-incrimination. The other view is that the claim must be treated as the equivalent of a derogatory answer. Thus, a claim against the question, "are you a Communist" must be treated as a confession of membership. It is this view, which is behind the cry, "Fifth Amendment Communist."

BEFORE turning to Griswold's effective attack on the latter view, it is well to note that it has a certain plausibility and has been accepted, not only by Senators, but also by professors sympathetic to our traditions of freedom. Their argument is that a witness asked "are you a Communist" can invoke the privilege properly only if a truthful answer would be "yes." For, otherwise, his answer would not be incriminating. Since the tribunal would destroy the privilege if it tried to determine the witness' answer before ruling on his claim, it will recognize the privilege even though the witness' truthful answer would be "no." But in that event, the witness, it is argued, should not claim the privilege, and if he does so, is a liar.

In joining those who have exploded this dilemma, Dean Griswold shows, first, by several hypothetical cases why a non-Communist would want to claim the privilege against the "are you" question. He then justifies such a claim as legally and morally proper by the following argument: The privilege protects the witness not only against direct admissions but also against furnishing leads or clues to other evidence which could be used against him in a criminal prosecution. But if the privilege may be properly claimed only if the answer to a particular question would be derogatory, the claim itself would furnish a clue by pinpointing the weak spot in the witness' armor. The witness must accordingly be given more elbow room in deciding where he will be silent.

WHILE Griswold disposes of the monstrous and mechanical degradation of the privilege involved in the "Fifth Amendment Communist" idea, he glosses over the opposite but equally untenable view, that a claim of privilege is not a justifiable basis for an adverse inference, for purposes other than reaching a verdict in a criminal trial. In many situations, the claim is, as Dean Griswold suggests, so ambiguous that judgment of the claimant should be suspended and automatic reprisals avoided. But this is merely a gentler way of saying that a claim raises a derogatory (although not a conclusive) inference. Otherwise, the claim alone would not generate doubt about the claimant.

The reason for this doubt will be made clearer by a reference to the basis for a proper claim of privilege. A claim is proper only if the witness fears that his answer to a line of inquiry might increase the danger of his being prosecuted for his past conduct. The claim thus suggests that there may be something in the witness' past which justifies this fear. Now this does not mean that the witness, even though he is invoking the privilege properly, necessarily has done something wrong. The witness may have unfounded fears or he may justifiably fear unfounded prosecutions. The claim is thus only an item of circumstantial evidence. It doesn't conclusively prove that the witness is a criminal or a Communist any more than possession of stol-

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en goods sometime after a theft means that the possessor is necessarily a thief or a fence. But the claim does make those propositions somewhat more likely than they would be without the claim. And that is all we mean (or should mean) when we say that a derogatory inference results from claim, considered *alone*.

If, as in Dean Griswold's carefully elaborated hypothetical situations, we had all of the facts, we might conclude that the derogatory inference is outweighed by the inference from other favorable facts and that no *conclusion* of wrongdoing is justified. But the witness refuses to supply the favorable facts and a residue of suspicion remains.

There is no clear formula for determining or even articulating how strong the suspicion should be. Perhaps the best that can be done is to emphasize the dangers of both overpersuasion and underpersuasion by a claim of privilege. Dean Griswold seeks to guard against such overpersuasion by admonishing us to consider a variety of factors such as the nature and fairness of the tribunal before which the claim is made, the nature of the question and its proximity to the area of free speech or political opinion, the witness' desire for a sanctuary from a situation which he finds oppressive, the witness' fear that he will be ensnared into a perjury prosecution. It is easy to see how in a particular case these factors would in general be relevant and, indeed, crucial to a final interpretation of a claim. But, since the underlying question is one of the witness' motivation, it is, of course, extremely difficult to determine what factors prompted the witness' claim and to bring them to bear on its meaning.

Dean Griswold's guides to interpretation raise a more fundamental difficulty. The witness who claims the privilege, not to protect himself against criminal punishment for past conduct, but solely for other purposes such as those suggested by the Dean, is abusing the privilege by invoking it for ends not sanctioned by the law. It is true that a witness may be moved by many motives in addition to fear of punishment for past conduct and yet make a justifiable claim of the privilege. But that motive must be present for the claim to be proper. And if we take the witness at his word and assume that he has this fear, a derogatory inference, *i.e.*, something that has meaning on the issue of wrongdoing, is justified. The fact that this fear is not the only reason for the claim does not destroy the basis of the inference or weaken it substantially.

It could, of course, be argued that these collateral objectives of the claimant would reduce the probative value of his claim because he would run the risks of disclosure if only his own skin were involved. But this argument appears to involve either a subtlety of discrimination too fine for practical purposes or to approach the contention that the witness is really not afraid of the criminal law, but is claiming the privilege in order to protect others, or to champion free speech, or to protest against procedural abuses or political opportunism on the part of the committees. Such objectives are always appealing and especially so, today, but the privilege is not the proper means for attaining them. The one thread which consistently runs throughout the application of the privilege by the courts is that the privilege is personal to the witness and is designed only for his own self-protection against the criminal law. It may be tempting for the witness to pervert the privilege because he believes the institution of Congressional investigations has been perverted. In this connection, Chief Justice Marshall's warning is pertinent:

> In conscience and in law [a claim known by the witness to be unjustified] is as much a perjury as if [the witness] had declared any other untruth upon his oath; as it is one of those cases in which the rule of law must be abandoned or the oath of the witness be received.

The witness should also be reminded that those who do not know of his secret and legally impermissible objective will draw a derogatory inference and that those who are informed of his real motive may wonder whether he is being more candid with them than he was with the tribunal. Finally, the witness who abuses the privilege should realize that each claim of privilege is currently a victory for the investigator. Except for the great betrayals by Fuchs and others, nothing has gained more popular support for irresponsible investigators than claims of privilege by professors, former government officials, and others, who are expected to observe standards higher than those which keep men out of jail.

DEAN GRISWOLD approaches the morality of using the privilege, for purposes other than self-protection, somewhat obliquely when he says a witness who waives the privilege as to himself but refuses to inform on his friends "is at least in no worse position morally than he was when he stood on the Fifth Amendment." This seems to me to be so cautious an understatement as to be almost misleading. The witness under these circumstances is in an infinitely stronger moral position. He has not pretended an apprehension which he does not feel, but has candidly disclosed his conscientious scruples. Since, however, he has reserved for his personal conscience matters which the law has settled by imposing a duty to testify, even against friends, he runs the risk of punishment for contempt.

It is understandable that a witness should want to avoid this risk while protecting others who, *he* knows, are in-

Closing the Resort

WHEN summer, no swerver at all,
Goes on and ahead
With towers that take in their walk
These overhead wires
Out of the haymost of heat
Northward to tuft and the tundra
And on to an ice glass fall,
The last to leave the resort
Are a man and a company moon,
Reciprocal watchmen
Over a lakeful of foil,
And its counters of lairs.
Just after some far fish dimple,
A hurdle of heron
Drips to a mercury flash.

These watchmen have heard and have known
In the tint of the night's five minds
The boniest caucus
Of the five flair rockers moved,
On the porch, to a cane-creak air,
As its voices tally in whispers
An inventory of catfish,
Down to the hair.
Now when the fishers are gone
And the ragweed spasmodic
And knuckled weeds of the wild
Are trembled along an edge,
The moon and the man,
For the cat-tail season, must climb
Up to an oystery porch
And hear it again.

REUEL DENNEY

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nocent and who might lose jobs and friends if he exposed their pasts. The privilege seems heaven-sent to such a witness because it permits him to avoid the informer's role without risk of punishment. He may make peace with himself despite Chief Justice Marshall's charge that he is a perjurer and despite doubts about his own omniscience. But he asks too much if he also asks that no derogatory inference be drawn from his claim.

THERE is one matter already touched on, which requires further discussion—the relationship between the privilege and other Constitutional guaranties. There are those who would expand the privilege into a general protection of free speech and fair procedure because, in their judgment, the courts have unduly narrowed the First Amendment's protection of free speech or have failed to strike down procedural outrages by Congressional committees or have failed to stop their "usurpation" of the functions of the grand jury and of the courts. Dean Griswold does not explicitly join in this effort to convert the privilege into a Constitutional utility man. Nevertheless, he seems willing to engage in a friendly flirtation. Thus he tells us:

> The significance of the privilege over the years has perhaps been greatest in connection with resistance to prosecutions for such offenses as heresy and political crimes. In these areas the privilege against self-incrimination has been a protection of freedom of thought and a hindrance to any government which might wish to prosecute for thoughts and opinions alone.

If his reference here is to our system, it seems unlikely to me that the facts would bear out the suggestion that the greatest significance of the privilege has been in connection with political prosecutions or heresy hunts. Even in a period when the government has trespassed on matters of opinion, the privilege still appears to have its primary, although not its most publicized, impact on the administration of the criminal law, that is, in grand-jury proceedings and criminal trials.

Dean Griswold tells us also that "the closer the question asked gets to the area of opinion and political belief, the less significant . . . is the refusal to answer questions." He does not tell us why this is so. And if it is so, it seems to me to be because the witness is attempting improperly to use the privilege as a kind of Super-First-Amendment.

It is worth repeating that the privilege should be carefully distinguished from the due process clause, the First Amendment, and the concept of separation of powers. The privilege, which is after all only a fragment of our Constitution, does not supply any general yardstick of procedural fairness or any guides as to the proper subjects of Congressional inquiry or loyalty investigations.

The objection to the attempt to stretch the privilege is based on something more significant than the lawyers' preference for the technically correct concept. There are many who would refuse the sanctuary of the privilege regardless of how unfair or overbearing an interrogation might be and regardless of its subject matter. Indeed, this is the course which Dean Griswold and other defenders of the privilege have recommended. Those who reject the privilege for themselves will not be afforded fair procedures no matter how much the privilege is expanded or how vigorous the attempt to dissipate the derogatory inference. Such attempts may boomerang by discrediting genuine claims of the right to silence based on the First Amendment. Moreover, the recent immunity statute will probably remove the privilege from a large area of Congressional investigations, without reducing most of the current abuses in some of those investigations. Finally, the privilege is useless in dealing with the procedural defects of the loyalty system. The privilege is thus clearly not an adequate or an appropriate tool for eliminating current procedural abuses or for meeting the dangers to free inquiry produced by a troubled world and anxiety-ridden community.

This is not to say that the more appropriate concepts—due process, free speech, and free assembly are now or ever were, sufficient to protect fair play and free discussion. Great judges like Judge Learned Hand and Mr. Justice Jackson, have warned us that the people and not the judiciary will determine the meaning of liberty. At a time when many are rightly troubled by its meaning, it is good that the people have Dean Griswold's reminder of the libertarian aspirations, traditions, and failures, of our system.

"No More Opinions . . . No More Politics"

by Leon Edel

OF William Butler Yeats it can truly be said that he had the "wisdom of the heart." By this I mean that he interrogated his feelings truthfully and wise words came to his lips to give them utterance. That is why his is one of the greatest poetic voices of our century: no other has quite found the cadence of our time in such an enchantment of words.

The Letters of W. B. Yeats, Edited by Allan Wade (Macmillan; $9.50).

James Joyce, his fellow-citizen and poet, was doubtless a greater verbal virtuoso. But he expressed the complicated labyrinth of the mind. Yeats gave us the voice of his uncomplicated heart.

This is not to say that Yeats was not a complex being. He had an intricate searching mind that reached deeply into the legends and superstitions of Ireland and was capable of penetrating below the surface of human ambiguity. More secure, not as tortured as Joyce's, needing no dagger definitions with which to stab, his mind asserted itself with a quiet pride and a strong sense of its own sovereignty. There is a letter in Allan Wade's splendid collection in which Yeats characterized himself with uncanny psychological precision. He is writing to his friend George Russel (AE):

> I desire the love of very few people, my equals or my superiors. The love of the rest would be a bond and an intrusion. These others will in time come to know that I am a fairly strong and capable man, and that I have gathered the strong and capable about me, and all who love work better than idle talk will support me. It is a long fight but that is the sport of it. The antagonism, which is sometimes between you and me, comes from the fact that though you are strong and capable yourself, you gather the weak and not very capable about you, and that I feel

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they are a danger to all good work. It is, I think, because you desire love.

Here speaks the artist-type, the proud poet: to such understanding of the nature of love, few of Yeat's contemporaries could testify. Love: the love between the strong and equal and the other love, that preys on others through lack of strength. The letters, brought together with such patience and care by Mr. Wade, are shot through with such psychological perceptions. "I look upon personality," wrote Yeats, "as the individual form of our passions." And when he characterizes his contemporaries it is to seize upon some intensity or passion in their being to explain their personality.

He recognizes at once the special qualities of James Joyce ("it is all atmosphere" he says of *Dubliners*) and understands his "cruel playful mind like a great soft tiger-cat" adding that *Ulysses* has "our Irish cruelty and also our kind of strength . . . Joyce never escapes from his Catholic sense of sin." He also, however, pays tribute to him as having surpassed in intensity any novelist of our time. To Ezra Pound he applies a borrowed but apt designation—"a revolutionary simpleton." And one understands Mrs. Patrick Campbell's "magnificent hysteria" on the stage, Yeats observes, when "one hears her hunting her monkey and her servant with an impartial fury about the house."

THE letters tell us much also of Yeats' lonely pilgrimage in search of love: this was the education of the heart, the discipline of the poetic sensibility. The letters to Maude Gonne have perished—but we long ago knew from his poems of the fierce touch of flame she gave to his prime and how it seared him into new heights of expression. What ultimately saved Yeats from the frustration of her passionate politics and her consuming beauty was the understanding friendship of other women. The letters he wrote to these are given to us in great abundance: they show the poet's shifting discoveries and explorations of himself and of life from day to day. Few readers, after going through these crowded pages, will disagree with Mr. Wade's view that those written to Olivia Shakespear seem to speak most fully for Yeats. To Lady Gregory he was writing to a fellow-espouser of causes, a fellow-worker for an Irish theatre; to Katharine Tynan he was writing to a more limited if valued literary countrywoman; to Florence Farr it was all poetry and the stage, the dramatist to the actress; but with Mrs. Shakespear of the sensitive profile and penetrating eye, he seemed genuinely at ease and the letters to her, chronicling (writes Mr. Wade) "details about his work, his reading, his health, his family, his other friends, his political ideas, his occult experiences and beliefs, small domestic happenings, jokes and gossip . . . are perhaps the most vivid and varied in the whole collection."

Mr. Wade's volume is, indeed, one of the richest collections of literary letters to have been published in our century. They contain the surplus of the poet's life beyond the margin of his poems. Extending from the 1880's to the eve of the Second World War they furnish matter for the historian of Ireland's literary renaissance and the growth of the Irish National Theatre: they show the Yeats who by degrees found himself enmeshed in a world of literary and political action, who founded societies and academies, established a theatre, wrote verse that touched the deepest issues of his day, sat as a Senator in the Irish parliament, and at the same time never allowed his lyric voice to rise in a shout or to grow hoarse—though his body was often weary to exhaustion. When he received the bounty of Sweden, the Swedish royal family said that of all Nobel prizemen who came to Stockholm he was the one who had the manners of a courtier. And while it may be strange to think of Yeats in terms of Sir Philip Sydney, his commitments to his time had something of the Elizabethan's versatility. It comes as no surprise that Yeats once turned down a knighthood offered by the British throne.

Intensely nationalist as he was, he saw his country and his countrymen with ironic detachment. He worshipped the Irish peasantry and hated the Irish mob; and very early he saw the danger of the watered-down literacy of a democracy and the fraud of the cultivated literacy of the totalitarians.

> Do not try to make a politician of me [he wrote in 1936], even in Ireland I shall never, I think, be that again—as my sense of reality deepens, and I think it does with age, my horror at the cruelty of governments grows greater, and if I did what you want, I would seem to hold one form of government more responsible than any other, and that would betray my convictions. Communist, Fascist, nationalist, clerical, anti-clerical, are all responsible according to the number of their victims. I have not been silent; I have used the only vehicle I possess —verse.

He was alluding here to his immortal lines in "The Second Coming" that speak of the "blood-dimmed tide" loosed upon the world and the drowning in it of the "ceremony of innocence." In the end he breathed a sigh of relief —"no more opinions, no more politics, no more practical tasks"—but presently he was organizing an Academy and fighting the battle to clear the name of Roger Casement.

There will be many who will be puzzled by the superstitious side of Yeats, the mystical side of a poet so grounded in reality: his study of theosophy, his casting of horoscopes, his addiction to signs and portents, his saturation in old philosophies. And yet it is not difficult to see how the Irish poet, aware of his deeper self, but steeped in folk-lore and folk-mystery, chose the medieval paths to the unconscious rather than those of modern psychology. At bottom he was seeking the same fabric, the deeper understanding of those forces from which creation springs.

Allan Wade, himself once a man of the stage and identified with the London seasons of the Abbey Theatre, was from the turn of the century a friend of Yeats and his bibliographer. His edition of the letters is a labor of love and devotion: he is always there, in the background; he never gets in front of the material yet is ready with the pertinent footnote and valuable fact whenever it is needed. His volume is an act of exemplary scholarship, by one who was himself on the scene of Yeats' life and has to come to know and feel its heroic drama.

Her Dream

I dreamed, as in my bed I lay
Night's fathomless wisdom come,
That I had shorn my locks away
And laid them on love's lettered tomb;
But something bore them out of sight
In a great tumult of the air,
And after nailed upon the night
Bernice's burning hair.

W. B. YEATS

The New Republic, October 22, 1930

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Capitalism's Critical Friend

by Alan Sweezy

KEYNES' position in modern economics was aptly described by the writer of a recent volume on money who said that, while his book was neither Keynesian nor anti-Keynesian, it was definitely not *pre*-Keynesian. To assess the contribution Keynes made to economics at its true value we must try to remember what pre-Keynesian thinking was like. Professor Harris' book provides us with some good reminders.

In the early years of the Depression, for example, economists generally opposed efforts to promote recovery through deficit financed government spending programs on the ground that such programs would merely take part of the available supply of saving away from private industry and thus defeat their purpose by reducing private investment. According to classical economics the supply of saving depends on people's attitudes toward thrift and accumulation in conjunction with the price borrowers are willing to pay for the use of savings, *i.e.*, the rate of interest. Government spending, so the argument ran, would do nothing to make people more thrifty. In order to attract funds the government would have to offer a higher rate of interest. That might increase the supply of savings slightly but its chief effect would be to divert savings from private borrowers.

John Maynard Keynes, by Seymour Harris (Scribner's; $3).

Keynes showed that this argument holds only if the economy is operating at full capacity, in which case an increase in the use of resources in one sector, *i.e.*, public works construction, would necessarily have to be balanced by a decrease in other sectors. But in a period of depression, with large scale unemployment and much excess plant capacity, this limitation would no longer apply. Increased employment in one sector would be quite compatible with, and would actually help to stimulate employment in other sectors. As to the supply of saving, Keynes pointed out that with an increase in production and employment, *i.e.*, with an increase in real incomes, the supply of saving would increase without the incentive of higher interest rates. To the pre-Keynesian way of thinking it would, as Professor Harris says, have seemed incredible that the government could have borrowed large sums of money, as it actually did from 1934 to 1940, at declining rates of interest and without any inflationary consequences.

The great contribution Keynes made to economics was in generalizing the main body of economic theory. The trouble with traditional ideas about thrift, balanced budgets, the relation of wages to employment, etc., is not that they are wrong *per se*, but rather that they apply only to certain limited sets of conditions. Economists had got into a muddle because they were trying to use classical theory to solve problems that lie outside its scope. Keynes' major work, *The General Theory of Employment*, was greeted with enthusiasm and relief when it appeared in the middle 1930's because it showed a clear, and basically simple, way out of the confusion.

THERE can no longer be any question about Keynes' triumph so far as professional economics is concerned. Even those economists who oppose the policies which Keynes personally favored use Keynesian theory in developing their arguments. How far the new thinking has penetrated beyond the economics profession is another matter. Although many books and articles have been written about Keynes and his work, many more will undoubtedly be needed before progress in popular understanding is in any sense satisfactory.

Professor Harris' book is a useful addition to the available material on Keynes. It is, as he tells us in the preface, intended primarily for the informed layman, and is well designed for this purpose, being much shorter than Harrod's biography and less technical than the books used in economics courses. It gives the reader a short account of Keynes' life and a comprehensive survey of his writings, illustrated and enlivened by many apt quotations from these writings.

Many of the passages Professor Harris quotes will be familiar to the great majority of economists. But there are others from Keynes' less known or not easily available publications which will, I think, be new even to close students of his work. To cite just one example, Harris quotes from an article Keynes wrote in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1932

> The Capitalist is a fair-weather friend. As soon as the storm passes, he abandons the duties of navigator and even sinks the boat which might carry him to safety, by his haste to push his neighbor off and himself in.

Caustic attacks such as this on capitalists should not lead anyone to think that Keynes was against capitalism itself. On the contrary, it was precisely because he valued the good things about capitalism so highly—that is, the scope it affords for decentralized decision-making in the direction of economic activity, and the freedom it gives the individual from complete dependence on the state—that he strove so mightily to improve its functioning and became so exasperated with the obtuseness of individual capitalists.

It would be impossible in one short book to cover all aspects of the work of so energetic and many-sided a genius as Keynes. I can not help regretting, however, that Professor Harris makes only passing reference to the remarkable essay Keynes wrote in 1930, "Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren." He dealt there with the question of how mankind will use the leisure which the progress of science and technology is making possible. While the prospect of greater leisure holds great promise, it also arouses certain misgivings:

> There is no country and no people, I think, who can look forward to the age of leisure and of abundance without a dread. For we have been trained too long to strive and not to enjoy.

Unfortunately, we may never have a chance to see how successful we could be in coping with the problem of leisure. As Keynes points out, our progressive release from humdrum economic activity depends not only on the continued advance of science and technology but also on our ability to avoid war and control population growth. The outlook on both of these counts is far less bright today than it was in 1930. Even if we avoid the total catastrophe of another world war, our present rate of population growth raises serious doubt about the future.

As far as the United States is con-

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cerned, we will undoubtedly be able to support the additional people for a long time to come. But much of the gain from rising productivity will be dissipated in combatting the increasing congestion, noise, air pollution, and other evils that continued rapid growth of population in our highly industrialized economy will inevitably bring with it. How Keynes would have felt about this prospect can be inferred, I think, from a letter Professor Harris quotes which Keynes and Trevelyan wrote opposing a tax on unimproved land as a tax on the preservation of beauty:

> These people are to be penalized by taxation until the bungalow builder and the real estate broker can have their way.

Low Tariffs and High Hopes

by Raymond Vernon

THE first victim in any political debate is, I suppose, a sense of proportion. There is a risk that this may be happening in the current donnybrook over the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act, which slipped through the House of Representatives last month by an uncomfortably small margin and now lies before the Senate.

Opponents of the Act, in their less restrained flights, want us to believe that the authority in the Act to reduce American tariffs by 15 percent will silence our mills, ruin our towns, wreck our living standards, and flood our nation with goods ground out at starvation wages by foreign slave labor. And the Act's supporters counter with the assertion that the issues involved include the economic existence of Japan, the weakening of our allies, and the isolation of the United States.

Revolution in World Trade: An American Foreign Policy, by Samuel Lubell (Harper; $2.50).

The truth is that although the defeat of the Trade Agreements Act would be a calamity, the free world's economic problems will not be greatly mitigated by a ten or fifteen percent reduction in America's tariffs, not even by their total suppression. While the prime economic problem of 1945 was Europe's economic recovery, the prime economic problem of 1955 is the growth of the underdeveloped areas of the world. These areas are determined to cram a social and industrial revolution—one which used to take a hundred years or more—into a generation or two. And many of them are prepared to turn for help to any source that seems to offer it.

Problems of this sort can be aggravated tenfold by high tariffs or the fear of high tariffs; but it is misleading to conclude that they can be cured by low ones. The underdeveloped areas of the world, for example, need capital as much as they need the chance to trade—all the capital that they can mobilize from their own resources and from the capital-surplus areas of the world. They need the vision to use that capital wisely; they need the courage to resist inflation; they need patience. Once the US has reassured them on its tariff policy, we shall only have begun the process of helping them with their struggle against stagnation.

At bottom, what seems to be worrying Samuel Lubbell in his new book, *The Revolution in World Trade*, is that we are paying too much attention to the tariff issue and too little to other economic problems. Those are the bare bones of his message; but his small book is populated by such a variety of hobgoblins, straw-men, jousts with windmills, and prescriptions for a brave new world that it proves a trifle exhausting.

According to Mr. Lubell, something akin to a conspiracy is afoot in this country—a conspiracy to divert our attention from all our complex international economic problems by focussing on only one, the lowering of our tariffs. The arch-conspirator would seem to be the President's Special Advisor and erstwhile chairman of the Randall Commission, Clarence B. Randall. But his plot is abetted by powerful American export interests greedy to expose the rest of the world to the merciless force of unbridled American competition.

For his part, Mr. Lubell sees a dim future for world trade. The world, he feels, is being divided up into self-contained vertically-integrated trading blocs whose existence tends to discourage such trade. He thinks, too, that gains from international trade are fast being reduced by modern technology which is substituting synthetics for natural raw materials. He feels, on the whole, that these are natural, inevitable, and perhaps irreversible trends.

Nor is his book confined to the problems of world trade. Within its 138 pages, a world disarmament proposal is also presented—a proposal whose relevance to the main theme of the book seems to stem only from the fact that Mr. Lubbell wrote it.

The oddest thing about this very odd whodunit is its concluding chapter entitled, appropriately enough, "What To Do." Mr. Lubbell takes his text for this chapter from Senator Millikin's dissent in the Randall Commission Report. "The main point to my mind," says the Senator, as quoted by Mr. Lubell, "which should not be obscured or bypassed by dogmatic or formulistic approaches is that we must keep ourselves free in all directions, at all times, to do whatever may be necessary in particular cases to promote our domestic and international security."

WITHOUT a pause, Lubell then proceeds to throw his support behind a series of proposals for international agreements which are as remote from Senator Millikin's philosophy as the tenets of Henry George. Mr. Lubell wants a two or three year truce on tariffs. (So, I suspect, does Mr. Randall; indeed such a truce was just concluded at the recent GATT meeting at Geneva.) Mr Lubell insists that we must have convertibility for the world's major currencies. (So, I am sure, does Mr. Randall.) Mr. Lubell is determined that a trade truce should include not only tariffs but also quantitative restrictions. (Mr. Randall could cheer.) Mr. Lubell wants to draw up an international code of fair investment practices. And he wants an international disarmament agreement, if he can get it, which will freeze the proportion of any nation's production that may go into defense. (Mr. Randall will have to speak for himself on these.)

If the reader is confused at this point, so was the reviewer. As far as his trade proposals are concerned, Mr. Lubell has come around full circle, and, with minor

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modifications of his own, has more or less endorsed the main tenets of the Administration's foreign trade program. To be sure, he does have his differences; he would hold tariffs at their present level, while the Administration would reduce them 10 or 15 percent; he would set up a separate United States foreign economic agency to "reconcile our strategic and economic interests," while the Administration is apparently bent on abolishing Harold Stassen's separate agency with the same objective in view. But for much of the rest, it is sound and fury.

I say all this a little sadly. For Mr. Lubell could have done better. He is, after all, a sophisticated journalist who seems to have labored hard to digest the facts of international trade. He knows how to make quantitative concepts trip lightly and more or less accurately across the page. He speaks with cogency and with more than a superficial knowledge about such things as Soviet trade, British sterling balances, and the dollar gap. He can be helpful to the reader who likes his economics slightly predigested. But he is a risk for the reader who will not distinguish description from surmise, fact from prescription, and Samuel Lubell from Stuart Mill.

The Illusion of Investigative Omnipotence

by Adam Yarmolinsky

AN almost unnoticed aspect of the current furor over Congressional investigations is their relative vulnerability to demagoguery, compared to other political institutions. There is no inherent reason why an inquest into the youthful opinions of a distinguished journalist should be held before a committee of the United States Senate established to survey the operations of the Executive Branch, rather than before an administrative tribunal such as the Federal Trade Commission, or in the course of judicial proceedings.

Grand Inquest: The Story of Congressional Investigations, by Telford Taylor (Simon and Schuster, $4.50).

In reaction to the investigational excesses of the last Congress, a plethora of proposals has been advanced for the reform of committee procedures, usually in the form of proposed codes of fair procedure. Most commentators have confined their attention to events of the last decade, on the principle that sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. A few have found a kind of poetic justice in the theory that the investigations of the New Deal era developed an engine of destruction that has now been turned on its creators. But it remained for Telford Taylor, a lawyer with a wide experience of government and private practice, to make the first really searching historical and functional analysis of the subject, for the general reader.

Mr. Taylor goes back to the parliamentary origins of the investigating committee, to the investigations of Major General Arthur St. Clair's Indian campaign, in the first decade of the Republic, and to the Know-Nothing investigations in New York in the 1850's. In the opinion of a New York common pleas judge of that era, Mr. Taylor finds a succinct statement of principles applicable to our contemporary difficulties. Out of Mr. Taylor's analysis there emerges a concept of the investigative power of the legislative branch as subject to basic limitations *vis-à-vis* the other branches of the national government, the states, and the individual. From these basic limitations, he draws practical conclusions about what can be done to undo what he calls "the illusion of investigative omnipotence."

Two of these proposals are particularly worth noting: Mr. Taylor would deprive Senate Committees of the permanent authority to issue subpoenas, given to them under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (and later given to the House Un-American Activities Committee). By requiring action by the appropriate House to authorize use of the subpoena power for a particular purpose, Mr. Taylor would halt many of the more outlandish investigative excursions before they got under way. In order to prevent the investigator from wandering too far afield, once he has set out on his quest, Mr. Taylor proposes to make the compulsion of testimony subject to immediate judicial review, so that the witness who declines to answer may obtain a judicial determination of his rights without first subjecting himself to the risk of a contempt conviction.

The latter proposal is not unlike the suggestion for improving loyalty-security procedures by permitting the employee to challenge the sufficiency of a charge against him before he assumes the substantial burden of negating it with affidavits and testimony. In the context of loyalty investigations, the proposal should tend to reduce the incidence of foolish and impertinent charges; in the context of Congressional hearings, it should tend to discourage improper questions.

Mr. Taylor covers his subject with unexampled thoroughness. He provides a summary of the relevant constitutional law, a useful review of current history, and a competent chapter on the privilege against self-incrimination. In this connection, he properly castigates those witnesses who avail themselves of the Fifth Amendment privilege in the mistaken belief that they are striking a blow for liberty.

The book includes a scholarly note on British parliamentary practice in conducting investigations, which Mr. Taylor, with admirable self-restraint, has placed in an appendix, since, as he points out, the British experience is so different as not to be directly relevant to our own problems. This discussion is headed "A Note for Laymen," and followed by "A Note for Lawyers on the New Federal 'Immunity Statute'." Laymen should not be frightened away however; Mr. Taylor is lucid even on home ground. Finally, there is "An Historical Note on Outlawry," a primitive legal concept that is being furbished up, according to Mr. Taylor, as a kind of atomic weapon in what he frequently refers to as the "cold civil war" between the champions of reaction, and the rest of us.

It is at this point that Mr. Taylor's analysis seems to me to go somewhat astray. The Fifth Amendment Communist is not placed beyond the protection of the laws because organized society has no other method of dealing with him, or (as was apparently often the case in the Middle Ages) because the ruling group wants to appropriate his goods and chattels. He is rather held up to public scorn and anger because his accusers know that popular insecurity

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needs to express itself in scorn and anger directed towards particular objects. If this kind of outlawry is itself outlawed, the formless fears about our national security must be resolved into specific concerns over problems susceptible, with effort, of rational solution. It is neither helpful nor realistic at this point to tell people that they must take sides in a "cold civil war."

We have recently been engaged in what might better be called a domestic police action against the forces of the extreme right, an action in which Mr. Taylor earned a decoration for valor. Skirmishes are still going on. Naturally, Mr. Taylor seems to regard his proposals for reform of Congressional investigating procedures primarily as defenses against new attacks from the same direction. It would be presumptuous to remind Mr. Taylor that democratic procedures are a defense against extremists of every kind. But perhaps he needs to be reminded that a police action is not a "civil war," and that one way to help preserve the distinction is to state it. Perhaps it would be helpful, also, to remind him that most people are still on his side.

America's Asian Dilemma

by H. Arthur Steiner

OUR relations with Asian countries are entering upon a new stage, even less satisfactory than before. We may not have as much time to modernize our arsenal of facts and ideas about Asia as we might like to have, but the rapid march of events in Asia leaves us no alternative but to exert the maximum mental effort.

Wanted: An Asian Policy, by Edwin O. Reischauer (Knopf; $3.75).

Professor Reischauer offers us a valuable guide to knowledge and understanding. He firmly grips both horns of our Asian dilemma and looks the tortured beast squarely in the eye. The result is a massive assault upon what he calls the "virtual taboo that has been built up against any serious consideration of the *bases* of our policies in Asia."

A sound American policy toward Asia must begin with a realistic education of the American public and its policy-makers in the complexities of the Asian situation. "We are *all* in the battle of Asia." Cold facts and cogent analysis may dispel the "mutual distrust and frenzied emotionalism" that have warped our national thinking about Asia. We need to see that a better explanation for our past failures lies in our insufficient knowledge and understanding of present-day Asia than in the treachery of individuals.

But the training of Asian specialists is not enough. The entire American public must appreciate why "obvious common sense in Brooklyn or Peoria," as Professor Reischauer puts it, "may be folly in Tokyo or New Delhi." Not until the broad masses of Americans are at home with such paradoxes is it likely that Congressmen will support effective long-run policies, or that the policy-makers who must sell policies to Congressmen will be encouraged to conceive the imaginative and intelligent measures of action that the situation requires.

Professor Reischauer believes that "the one overriding objective" of our current foreign relations "is inevitably the furtherance of our own peace and security." Our principal interest in Asia is to have the peoples of Asia contribute to "strengthening rather than weakening the peace and stability of the world." If we are to cope with the Communist threat, acknowledged as the principal menace to our own peace and security and to the peace and stability of the world, "our chief reason for desiring the development of truly independent nations throughout Asia is our hope that they will become *healthy* members of a *democratic* world order." This hope will not be served if we deliver the symbols of nationalism and independence to the Communists; it will not be served if (wittingly or unwittingly) we assume a rigid posture, formulate intemperate demands, or ape the heavy-handed and totalitarian methods of the Communists.

The principal means available to us for the implementation of a sound strategy in Asia are (1) military, (2) economic, and (3) ideological. Professor Reischauer believes that "we should defend as much of Asia as we can from Communist aggression" when confronted by aggressive actions, but that "our ability to defend much of Asia by arms is extremely limited." Considering the breadth of our overall objectives in Asia, he considers the military solution as the most costly and restricted: "To limit policy to the military level would be to maximize costs and minimize results."

The patterns of Communist aggression in Asia do not offer us suitable targets for A-bombs. In the light of the whole situation, moreover, any possible advantage in employing atomic weapons "would be altogether inconsequential when measured against the adverse psychological effect." (K. M. Panikkar has recently taken the pains to demonstrate historically that Asian peoples have never responded to Western acts of brutality and blood-letting with admiration, respect or affection.) Professor Reischauer also argues that "an American defense line the length of Asia is nothing more than a chauvinist's pipe dream"—if only because the continued presence of American garrisons in Asian countries required to support such a policy "would probably do more to increase the already strong internal threat from Communism than it would to decrease the external menace."

Turning to the economic solution, which "operates on the front line of internal defense where American military power does not reach at all," Professor Reischauer believes that what little we have attempted "has been soundly conceived and executed with increasing efficiency." But we have not expended what we might along these lines, and our policy of tying economic and technical assistance to political and military commitments has tended to undermine our policy on all fronts. Furthermore, the results of economic activity may be so charted as to give us the impression that real progress has been made—when what has been done may not correspond to a felt local need, and may not contribute to the strengthening of political institutions.

Here Professor Reischauer offers wise counsel to the optimistic "economists":

> Economic and technical aid alone will certainly not decide the war between democracy and totalitarianism. It can be a potent weapon for the democratic side, *but many fateful decisions in*

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> pretty girls and singing, we'll bash your brains in." . . . Even our own men did not know why they were fighting . . . it is regrettable when a nation or a man has a perfectly moral job to do but fails to explain to himself or the world why the task is essential and upon what moral principles it is based . . . the morale of our men was so low that six times I had the opportunity to address large groups on the simple A-B-C's of America's existence.

The jet pilot hero of the film and the novel not only does not know why he is fighting, but he is convinced that he ought not to be involved at all, since he has already fought at Guadalcanal and New Guinea and since in America no one seems to be aware of the Korean War or to care at all about Korea.

When the admiral in command of the task force assumes the burden of moral justification, his formulations leave the hero entirely unmoved. He is told that unless Korea is defended, Southeast Asia, Japan, and even California and Colorado will be overrun, and the front will have to be stabilized on the Mississippi; and he is told that civilization has always had to be defended by the sacrifices of the few. "But why by me?" is his unanswerable question. He does not want to be one of the few who sacrifice themselves for civilization, he just does not want to be killed; and the mounting likelihood that he will be brings him close to nervous collapse. And when his wife comes to Japan on a surprise visit, the admiral finds her equally unwilling to believe that the war has a meaning and justification. It is only when the admiral tells her that his two sons have been killed, his wife has gone insane, and his widowed daughter-in-law has become a nymphomaniac, that a sudden and absurd reversal of attitude occurs: she asks if the admiral thinks that she too will become a nymphomaniac should her husband be killed, and his answer is: "Perhaps. If we refuse to acknowledge what we're involved in, terrible consequences may follow."

This is hardly an answer in itself, unless the war is being fought to prevent nymphomania, clearly a self-defeating purpose. But it is a statement of Michener's intention which defines and characterizes the successful passages of the film very well. For in the film the aerial camera acknowledges what the men at war are involved in with a directness which the novel can, at best, barely suggest. The camera shows the men in immediate relation to the complex armament of the task force, the very power of which overpowers them, delivering them to the absolute physical domination of the sea, the sky, the weather and the mountains. The immediate enemy most of the time and the major threat all the time is not the nearness of any human enemy, but technological might united with physical immensity, which may destroy them at any moment and which has exposed them to the mercy of the globe itself. Thus the pilots feel that the raiment they have to wear for a flight is itself a degradation in which they are zombies rather than human beings.

The mere statement in the novel that they sweat like pigs and look like watermelons after putting on G-suit, inch-thick underwear, poopy suit, crash helmet, survival vest and oxygen tube becomes, in the film, more than something seen and felt when the exhausted pilots have to be lifted out of the jets like infants by the ground crew. The novel describes the jet pilot as one "about to soar into space with a freedom no previous men in history have known," but "loaded down with such intolerable burdens that at times he felt he must suffocate." The camera shows the freedom as subjugation, the strength as weakness, from the moment that the jet is fired into space by a catapult to the most perilous moment of all when a return landing must be made on a lurching deck.

This ominous and overwhelming meaning appears in the opening episode: the hero, in a state of helplessness which has no precedent in Hollywood films, has had to ditch his plane in waters so cold that he will freeze to death in twenty minutes. By the time the helicopter dispatched to rescue him descends upon him, like a gigantic lobster with revolving claws, and lowers a steel hoist sling to him, he is too weak to climb into it and one of his rescuers must plunge into the water to fix the apparatus under his shoulders, making another helicopter necessary to rescue the rescuer. As the hero is lifted from the water, unconscious, he resembles the corpse of a drowned man; as he is flown back to the carrier, swinging and dangling in air at the end of a long rod, his slumped head and inert form make him resemble the hanged victim of a lynching.

In the concluding episode, his plane is downed on land, and as he crouches defenseless in an irrigation ditch, once again a helicopter circles to rescue him, as radio-telephone comunications alert the task force and summon jets to protect him by flying in waves overhead and strafing the Chinese soldiers who move slowly toward him from hiding in the rice field and the ridges beyond. As the first wave of jets roars down, driving the Chinese to cover, the paid admissions wake from the fearful trance which the images of technological and geopolitical reality have induced. This will be as it has always been, in every Western; the Navy will not permit the hero to perish upon the screen, but just when all seems hopeless, just before it is too late, the jets like the cavalry or the Marines, will rout the savages. But the trance returns as again and again the jets roar down: each time that their machine-gun fire cuts down two or three advancing Chinese soldiers ten more seem to rise from the ground, from the hills, from nowhere, to take their place. And when the hero falls dead in the ditch, the possibility of every emotion from dismay to amazement has long since passed. The aerial camera has been taking candid shots of Armageddon all along.

DELMORE SCHWARTZ

American Demagogues

by Reinhard H. Luthin

"engrossing and rewarding portrait of ten mob masters of 20th century American politics"

SATURDAY REVIEW

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PHOTOGRAPHY

"THE FAMILY OF MAN," a current show at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, is no ordinary photographic exhibition, but rather a gigantic picture story with a point of view that is essentially journalistic. Yet, there are as many photographs which stand out as expressive or creative communications as there are those which are reportorial statements or pictorial backdrops. Fathered by Edward Steichen, the exhibit is described by him as "An exhibition of creative photography, dedicated to the dignity of man, with examples from 68 countries." About 500 photographs are assembled to illustrate the view that man's response to life is universal.

Despite the fact that the selection was made from the work of amateurs and professionals alike and the world was searched for unknown talent, the photographs of experienced professionals dominate. A few good Cartier-Bressons and Brassais are always a pleasure to look at. Werner Bischof, who was killed in Peru last year, shows up increasingly well the more often his work is shown. His simple picture, for instance, of a group of Hungarian workmen drinking in a tavern, is both sensitive and technically satisfying. Ruth Orkin's series of a wily little girl playing cards with three small friends adds the touch of humor so often lacking in photography. More amusement comes with Arthur Witmann's picture of a laughing audience in an unidentified theater and Herbert List's picture of a man and woman sunning themselves in a German city.

W. Eugene Smith's and Robert Frank's work is moving, though neither is represented by his best pictures. There are numerous fine examples of Wayne Miller's photographs, most of them of his family, while Dorothea Lange's pictures of the depression era are penetrating reminders of a grim American era. Conspicuously absent are Walker Evans' masterpieces of the same period. Other familiar names turn up with excellent pictures. A photographer not familiar in this country, Leonti Planskoy, shows a breadth of expression whether photographing Brazilians in a dancing orgy or Spanish parents lamenting a child who lies in doll-like death in a tiny coffin. Occasionally a country is represented by a native photographer —Satyajit Ray of India or Brassai of France.

There are a few contributions from the USSR, instructive as subject-matter, mediocre as photographs. Occasionally an unidentified photograph, such as one of a lynched Negro chained to a tree, sears the mind. The most delightful note of all is struck by Eugene V. Harris' impish piper, theme picture of the show.

Undeniably there are many memorable photographs in this exhibition and for this reason alone it deserves the enormous popular success it is having. On the other hand, one is asked to accept its cosmic One Man declaration and to fight through its pretentious presentation.

Carl Sandburg, Steichen's brother-in-law, sums up in a printed prologue distributed to the visitors:

> There is only one man in the world
> and his name is All Men.
> There is only one woman in the world
> and her name is All Women.
> There is only one child in the world
> and the child's name is All Children.

This theme is driven home not only in pictures, but in hand-outs and cut-outs and quotations from Genesis to Joyce.

Good photographs speak for themselves. Steichen probably would be the first to agree, but somehow he and Paul Rudolf, a gifted Florida architect, designed a display so elaborate that the photographs become less important than the methods of displaying them. Birth, certainly a universal experience, is vividly climaxed by an extraordinarily sharp and realistic picture by Wayne Miller. Yet his photograph and others in the series are displayed on a raised dais surrounded by virginal white gauze. Pictures of children throughout the world playing ring-around-a-rosy are contorted into trapezoids and mounted on a circular metal construction. In another instance a man is chopping wood high in a tree top. This undistinguished photograph has been mounted horizontally over the spectator's head. To see it properly he has to get in the same position as the photographer who took the picture, on his back! Farther on, four unfortunate Australians have been severed from their land and made into free standing black silhouettes. Photographs grow from pink and lavender poles, dangle from the ceiling, lie on the floor, protrude from the wall. Some, happily, just hang.

In case the point has not yet been made, toward the end of the exhibit, there is a group of nine portraits arranged around—yes, a mirror. Alongside is a quotation from Bertrand Russell: ". . . for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration."

There are other exercises, such as the extreme blowups that cannot be seen properly from afar, or the occasional cropping of a photograph to fit a prearranged space or shape. Such practices often are anathema to a photographer who conceives of his picture in a specific composition and an optimum size. Finally, there are too many photographs and too many mediocre ones. As it now stands, the show is most rewarding looked at a section or two at a time. The whole of life is hard to take in a couple of hours.

Fortunately no amount of tricky exhibition technique can destroy really great photographs. "The Family of Man" has many of them, and they are well worth seeing. ROLLIE MCKENNA

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Notes on the Critics

BERNARD MELTZER is a practicing attorney, on leave from the University of Chicago law faculty. LEON EDEL is completing his biography of Henry James. ALAN SWEEZY teaches economics at Stanford University. RAYMOND VERNON was formerly a staff member of the Randall Commission. ADAM YARMOLINSKY, a Washington lawyer, is a consultant to The Fund for the Republic. H. ARTHUR STEINER is professor of political science at the University of California at Los Angeles. ROLLIE MCKENNA is a New York photographer.

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CORRESPONDENCE

► Religion and Morality

SIRS:

"The Morality of Self-Respect" by Brand Blanshard (*NR*, February 28) is excellent! It is a pleasure to hear from such a clear thinker.

MR. AND MRS. CONNER REED

Port Angeles, Wash.

SIRS:

I think on the whole I agree with Professor Blanshard's article. I certainly agree with his position that upholding a religious belief which you no longer share, because it is regarded as morally serviceable, is the worst kind of dishonesty. I don't quite like his identification of theology and religion. Theologies are efforts to state religious beliefs in rational terms, and they do not guarantee religious vitality. I partly agree with his opinion about a morality based upon a sense of honor and self-respect, although I wonder what he means by self-respect. There is a kind of self-respect which is incompatible with humility and charity, which is the highest form of morality. I note that Professor Blanshard rather assumes that reasonableness is a fruit of rationality. I would question that. I think that so-called "rational people" find it as hard to be reasonable as religious people find it difficult to be charitable.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Union Theology and Seminary

New York City

SIRS:

In his article "The Morality of Self-Respect," (*NR*, February 28), Professor Brand Blanshard admits that there is "some potency" in Bishop Fulton Sheen's appeal for a "return to God" as a basis for moral reawakening; yet he seems to dismiss the persuasions of Catholicism on strange grounds.

Prof. Blanshard . . . seems to make no distinction between simple-minded, merely-rosy versions of Christianity and the extremely hard-hitting, carefully defined doctrines of genuine Catholicism. After all, any religion that has for its central symbol Christ crucified at the hands of His fellowmen can hardly be called a religion which logically should sanction a "moral holiday," with "garlands and unending glory," unearned, at the "journey's end." If he wants to dismiss Catholicism, Prof. Blanshard ought to try it on more sophisticated grounds, taking into account the terrible heights and depths of the human will, and the Catholic doctrine of original sin—which is the ultimate stumbling block for any humanist.

Prof. Blanshard himself suggests what erraticisms mere "self-respect" can lead to: adulation of "hollywoodish" patterns, etc.

EDWIN KENNEBECK

New York City

SIRS:

Mr. Blanshard says "Justice is right and reasonable, whether tied to theology or not. . . ." This is little more than saying that "justice is justice and justice," leaving the question of definition and delineation unanswered.

What Blanshard leaves unsaid in his argument is that the very definitions of and tendencies toward "good, justice, right, reasonable," etc., which he holds, he holds on account of his own historical and cultural perspective.

RICHARD G. STEVENS

Chicago, Illinois

SIRS:

Professor Blanshard argues persuasively that morality can stand on its own feet, without theological support. A churchman like myself can feel sympathetic to his argument because by "theological support" he has in view formalized doctrine, "religious beliefs," "dogma," "archaic theological lumber." I would agree that one cannot establish any dependable relation between morality and religion so defined. It all depends upon whether there is genuine faith behind the creed. Without a potent faith—something which engages the man at both a rational and pre-rational level—the man's theology will be more or less irrelevant to the life he leads. . . .

In an apocalyptic age like ours some minds would deal with the violence by an appeal to sagacity, reasonableness, humane norms. This is what Professor Blanshard appears to do. The counsel to keep our heads, to avoid fanaticism, not to get excited, is one reaction to our times. This common sense vein is heard on various sides today though it is often a little shrill, as when a man tries to speak naturally when he is scared. Others will react by welcoming what an apocalyptic age can teach us as to the dynamics, discontinuities and ultimate resources of existence. They are likely to conclude that when an inadequate myth goes an adequate one is to be sought, for there is no significant orientation of life or motivation for morality with myth in the sense of faith.

It is true that Professor Blanshard would base morality on self-respect in the sense of a true ideal of the self, and he speaks of "admiration" of such an ideal, and of "falling in love" with it. Here, indeed, he recognizes the deeper motivations of conduct. I would argue, however, that religious faith in terms of a dynamic vision of the world and of man is a necessary context of such admiration if it is to have its largest effectivenesses.

Cambridge, Mass. AMOS N. WILDER

Editor's Note

Numerous comments have been received in response to publication recently of an attack by Mr. Sol Stein, Executive Director of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, on an article by Brian Gilbert entitled "New Light on the Lattimore Case" (*NR*, December 27). Among those expressing general support of the *NR*'s criticism of procedures followed by the McCarran Committee and the government in their investigation and prosecution of Owen Lattimore are W. E. Bentley, Elmer Davis, Eleanor Hope Johnson, Murray Kempton and Dan H. McCullough. James T. Farrell endorses the views of his fellow member of the ACCF Executive Committee, Norman Thomas (*NR*, February 28); and Herbert J. Muller of Lafayette, Indiana, requests correction of our erroneous identification of him as belonging to the Executive Committee: "I am not and have not been a member of this Committee, and therefore had no connection whatever with the unleashing of Mr. Stein on Mr. Lattimore."

The publication in the *NR* of opinions on this matter is now concluded.

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

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this Journal of Opinion is an intellectual challenge, because its coverage is reflective, as well as reportorial.



Some people like a lift . . .

without a let-down, and the heady discussion of ideas in the *New Republic* is always stimulating.



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it's useful to have a magazine which puts events in focus, which distinguishes the important from the incidental—at home and abroad.



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

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